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Punjab is a strategically and economically important state for India. It shares a 
border with both Pakistan, a historical rival, and with the state of Kashmir, which is at the 
center of India’s conflict with Pakistan. Punjab is also the breadbasket of India and 
provides a number of recruits for the military, both of which are essential for food and 
physical security for an economically rising country. In the 1980s, Punjab experienced a 
decade-long violent insurgency caused by grievances arising from the unequal 
distribution of benefits from the Green Revolution. The state’s economy has been in 
decline for the past decade, which, along with a rise in drug use and trade, represents 
grounds for a crisis that threatens its post-insurgency stability. The unaddressed drug 
epidemic allows the emerging drug-crime-terror nexus to thrive. However, national and 
state-level elites and politicians continue to use identity as a mobilization tool for 
engaging with the population, mirroring the setting that led to the previous insurgency. 
Specifically, this research provides an insight into the growing possibility of instability in 
Punjab. This research derives implications for stability in a border state with porous 
borders experiencing increased drug use.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Punjab has been described as the “granary of India” and is more commonly 
referred to as India’s breadbasket as a result of the Green Revolution, and was considered 
“a model province” and “an object of envy” for other states in India.1 Historically, 
Punjab also underwent a prolonged period of an insurgency that lasted from the late 
1970s to early 1990s, in which the state became the setting for a protracted battle between 
the central government and a robust separatist movement led by Sikh extremists. The 
critical nature of the insurgency was highlighted because of the state’s shared border with 
Pakistan with whom India has fought four wars since 1947. Recent reports highlight a 
new element of concern that may produce instability again in this important region of 
India. A significant rise in the number of drug users and addicts in the state points to a 
pending crisis that is a threat to the state’s economy, stability, and external relations.2 An 
increase in illegal drug seizures by the Indian authorities from 2012–2014 indicates the 
rise of the drug trade in the country overall and specifically in Punjab, which accounts for 
most of the heroin seized in India originating from Afghanistan.3 The important question 
that emerges from these conditions is: could the growing drug use and trade in Punjab, if 
left inadequately addressed, create conditions similar to the ones leading up to the 
Khalistan insurgency? Widespread drug use, especially among the youth, in Punjab may 
lead to domestic instability in the state, especially because “the Indian authorities are 
                                                 
1 J. S. Grewal, The Sikhs of the Punjab (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 209. 
2 See for example, Jaiveer Shergill, “It’s Time to End Punjab’s Drug Epidemic,” Daily Mail India, 
November 26, 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2850879/It-s-time-end-
Punjab-s-drug-epidemic.html; Jim Yardley, “Indian State Finds Itself in Tight Grip of Addiction,” The New 
York Times, April 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/19/world/asia/drug-addiction-is-a-growing-
problem-in-punjab.html; Deeptiman Tiwary, “Use of Synthetic Drugs on the Rise in India - Times of 
India,” The Times of India, November 25, 2013, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Use-of-synthetic-
drugs-on-the-rise-in-India/articleshow/26334302.cms; Swati Mahajan, “Drug Use Rising among Adolesc: 
ents in Chandigarh,” The Indian Express, April 17, 2016, http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/chandigarh/
drug-dealers-punjab-drug-use-rising-among-adolescents-in-chandigarh/; Simon Denyer, “Drug Epidemic 
Grips India’s Punjab State,” Washington Post, January 1, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
drug-epidemic-grips-indias-punjab-state/2012/12/31/092719a2-48f6-11e2-b6f0-e851e741d196_story.html. 
3 United Nations, International Narcotics Control Board Report 2015, 74, accessed June 1, 2016, 
https://www.incb.org/incb/en/publications/annual-reports/annual-report-2015.html. 
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currently failing to address adequately the issue of drug use within their own borders.”4 
The drug menace further provides an opportunity for extremist elements or non-state 
actors to provide oxygen to fuel the population’s dissent within Punjab resulting from the 
state’s slow economic decline compared to other states in the country.5  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Although Punjab is considered to be stable since the mid-1990s, economic decline 
associated with the increasing drug economy may create an environment conducive for 
regional instability. Punjab’s stability has regional implications as it is a border state with 
both Pakistan and the Indian state of Kashmir, and at the same time, the breadbasket of 
India, which is essential for the nation’s food security. The Indian government was able 
to end the Sikh separatist insurgency in the 1990s. However, the government’s use of 
overwhelming force and the destruction resulting from the Indian Army’s offensive into 
Sikhism’s holiest site, The Golden Temple, during Operation Blue Star to flush out the 
militants remains fresh in the memories of a large number of Sikhs. 
Punjab has and will continue to play a central role in Indian politics. Thus, the 
research question is particularly important not only for India’s border security but for the 
nation’s stability as it continues to address the Naxalite insurgency in the northeast and 
the Kashmir separatist movement in the north.6 The Indian authorities may not be well-
prepared to deal with an additional insurgency as it could embolden the already active 
movements in Kashmir and the northeast, and at the same time provide the opportunity 
for external actors to play a more active role in destabilizing the country. Unrest in a 
region also provides opportunities for criminals “to exploit instability caused by 
                                                 
4 Molly Charles, Dave Bewley-Taylor, and Amanda Neidpath, “Drug Policy in India: Compounding 
Harm” (The Beckley Foundation, October 2005), 7, http://reformdrugpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/
10/Drug-Policy-in-India-Compounding-Harm.pdf. 
5 Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar, “Why Punjab Has Suffered Long, Steady Decline,” in Economic 
Freedom of the States of India 2012, by Bibek Debroy et al. (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2013), 33–
65, https://object.cato.org/economic-freedom-india/Economic-Freedom-States-of-India-2012.pdf. 
6 Christopher Shay, “Expansion of Mining Risks a Naxalite Resurgence in India’s Red Corridor,” IISS 
Voices, May 4, 2016, https://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2016-9143/may-12f3/
mining-and-naxalites-b551; Vinay Kaura, “India’s Challenge: Containing Kashmir’s Insurgency,” The 
Diplomat, July 14, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/indias-challenge-containing-kashmirs-
insurgency/. 
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conflicts,” and allows them to thrive in situations where the government cannot provide 
security.7 Furthermore, instability in Punjab, having the distinction of being India’s 
breadbasket, can have dire consequences for India’s food security. Punjab’s share of 
wheat and rice procured by the Indian government for food security purposes accounted 
for 40.6 percent and 26.1 percent, respectively, for the 2014–2015 fiscal year.8  
Punjab also has the distinction of being over-represented in the armed forces, 
comprising “as much as 8 percent at independence to as high as 10–13 percent in the 
1980s” of the service, while the total Sikh population according to 2011 census in the 
country is about 2.29 percent.9 During the Khalistan insurgency in the 1980s, the Indian 
government had to contend with a number of mutinies in the Sikh regiments of the Indian 
Army—this may reoccur if an insurgency re-appears in the state.  
Lastly, as is the case with Kashmir, Punjab also represents the ideals of India’s 
secular policy; the only Sikh-majority Indian state is a testament to the world that 
populations of different religions can prosper in a pluralistic India.10 If the Indian 
government wants to ensure stability for the nation, it needs to place a premium on 
addressing the current “Punjab Problem.” To that extent, this study addresses the 
possibility of widespread instability and mobilization accounting for the complex 
interplay between economic decline, drug-crime-terror nexus, and social impacts of drug 
addiction.  
More generally, this research derives implications of increased drug use among a 
population in a border state with porous borders for the domestic and regional stability. 
Scholars have studied extensively the causes of instability (economic deprivation, 
religious differences, state violence, discrimination, etc.), but there exists a gap in 
                                                 
7 United Nations, Crime and Instability: Case Studies of Transnational Threats (United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime, February 2010), iii, https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/
Crime_and_instability_2010_final_low_res.pdf. 
8 India Brand Equity Foundation, “Industrial Development & Economic Growth in Punjab,” February 
2016, http://www.ibef.org/states/punjab-presentation. 
9 Omar Khalidi, “Ethnic Group Recruitment in the Indian Army: The Contrasting Cases of Sikhs, 
Muslims, Gurkhas and Others,” Pacific Affairs 74, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 536. 
10 Šumit Ganguly, “Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional 
Decay,” International Security 21, no. 2 (1996): 79, doi:10.2307/2539071. 
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explaining how rising drug addiction in a region can contribute to group mobilization and 
subsequent instability. This thesis will make contributions towards this literature as well. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review provides the theoretical framework and the historical 
background of Punjab necessary for this research. It also analyzes relevant published 
work regarding causes of insurgencies, the factors that contributed to the Sikh separatist 
insurgency in India, options available to governments for confronting such movements, 
and how the Indian government has historically dealt with insurgencies within its 
borders. Lastly, a review of published material regarding the impact of drugs on local 
economies is presented, which is essential to answering the research question and 
detailing the manner in which drug abuse directly contributes to destabilizing a region. 
1. Insurgencies 
Bard O’Neill defines an insurgency as “a struggle between a non-ruling group and 
the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources 
and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more 
aspects of politics.”11 The main goal of the insurgents is to achieve their political 
objectives by increasing their control over the local population, while making it difficult 
for the government to administer the region, and diminishing the government’s influence 
in the territory.12 Insurgencies can use both violent and non-violent tools such as 
coercion, terrorism, propaganda, and political mobilization to attain their objectives.13 It 
is important to make the distinction between an insurgency and terrorism, as the former’s 
energy is directed against the existing political authority “with an unwavering will to 
change the status quo,” while the latter may be used as a deliberate strategy to achieve the 
                                                 
11 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Washington: 
Brassey’s, 1990), 13. 
12 Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide” (Department of 
State, January 2009), 6, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf. 
13 Ibid. 
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intended political objective.14 Although all insurgencies are not the same, they do share 
some common characteristics: they are mainly internal conflicts, seek to weaken a 
“state’s grip on power,” do not distinguish between military forces and civilian 
populations, and their desire for change is based on “uprising from within.”15 
Jugdep Chima asserts that “violent subnationalist [ethnonationalist] movements 
arise when competing ethnic and state elites cannot resolve their political differences and 
ethnic militants emerge often, but not always, facilitated by either traditional ethnic elites 
or state elites to use in their respective intra-system struggles or against each other.”16 He 
further adds that interaction between state and ethnic elites have significant influence on 
the direction of an ethnonationalist movement because they can define “the relationship 
between an ethnic group and the central state.”17 Shahid Siddiqi argues that root causes 
of insurgencies “are invariably to be found in political, socio-economic or religious 
domains, their nature and scope depending upon the nature of the grievances, motivations 
and demands of the people.”18 Atul Kohli argues that periodic self-determination 
movements are to be expected, especially in developing-country democracies.19 Sumit 
Ganguly explains that political mobilization, specifically in India, resulted from “growing 
education opportunities and concomitant increases in literacy and media exposure.”20 
These mobilizations were mostly “class-based and ethnic agitation for autonomy and 
even secession.”21 Ganguly focuses on the likelihood of political mobilization resulting 
in political violence if governments fail to accommodate political demands in regions 
                                                 
14 Archana Upadhyay, India’s Fragile Borderlands: The Dynamics of Terrorism in North East India, 
vol. 39 (London, UK: IB Tauris, 2009), 19. 
15 R. Scott Moore, “The Basics of Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars Journal 14 (2007): 3–4, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/moorecoinpaper.pdf. 
16 Jugdep S. Chima, The Sikh Separatist Insurgency in India: Political Leadership and 
Ethnonationalist Movements (New Delhi: SAGE Publications India, 2010), 9. 
17 Ibid., 8. 
18 Shahid R. Siddiqi, “Insurgency Movements in India,” Foreign Policy Journal, December 22, 2010, 
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/12/22/insurgency-movements-in-india/. 
19 Atul Kohli, “Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Rise and Decline of Self-
Determination Movements in India,” Journal of Asian Studies 56, no. 2 (1997): 325. 
20 Ganguly, “Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency,” 83. 
21 Ibid. 
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with institutional decay.22 Scott Moore points to the complex interaction of competing 
beliefs (identities and culture, opinions and perceptions, historical narratives), 
unacceptable structures (ineffective authority, military occupation, struggle for natural 
resources, modernization, poverty, social stratification), and catalytic actions (state 
violence, intervention, deprivation, repressing, corruption, discrimination, crime) as 
causes of insurgencies.23  
It is difficult to point to any one event or aspect of grievances by the mobilizing 
group to determine the cause of an ethnonationalist movement, and similarly how a 
government responds will vary depending on each situation. Drug addiction or abuse, as 
it turns out, is not described as a contributing factor to insurgencies. Yet, drug addiction 
can facilitate conditions that Moore describes. A decline in participation in the economy, 
decaying civil society, and an increase in crime associated with drug trade and use, can 
all lead to instability in a society. In this context, it is important to understand the causes 
of the Punjab insurgency in the 1980s. What were the conditions that created the 
insurgency?  
2. The Separatist Insurgency in Punjab 
The Sikh Separatist Insurgency in Punjab was a violent ethnonationalist 
movement led by Sikh extremists against the Indian central government—with demands 
for a separate land for the Sikhs called Khalistan—that started in the late 1970s and lasted 
through the early 1990s. The causes of this movement are important to review because 
Punjab is one of the richest states in India, yet its trajectory into having to confront a 
robust militancy is puzzling. Determining the causes of the historical movement will 
allow comparison between the contemporary conditions in Punjab, and help identify 
whether the same conditions are reoccurring due to expansion of the drug trade and 
increased addiction.  
Tara Kartha argues that conflict in Punjab “arose from a complex web of 
economic factors, political malfeasance, and sheer opportunism, cloaked in religious-
                                                 
22 Ibid., 77. 
23 Moore, “The Basics of Counterinsurgency,” 8. 
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ethnic vituperation.”24 Paul Brass does not believe that economic disparities were the 
primary reasons behind the rise of the Punjab militancy; he argues that one of the 
problems “in finding a satisfactory economic explanation for the Punjab crisis is the fact 
that, on the great majority of aggregate economic indicators, Punjab is at the top or very 
close to the top in comparison with all other Indian States.”25 Therefore, he implies that 
there were no economic grievances leading up to the insurgency. He instead puts forth 
the notion that the militancy in Punjab “was precipitated by a religious conflict between 
militant orthodox and fundamentalist Sikh groups and a heterodox Sikh-Hindu sect.”26  
However, several scholars disagree with Brass, and instead highlight the 
importance of the economy in insurgencies generally, which is important for us to 
understand as it relates to the drug trade in Punjab today. Hamish Telford argues that 
support for the insurgency was “generated out of the unequal distribution of benefits from 
the green revolution.”27 He further points out that explanations attributing the “Punjab 
Crisis” to religious conflict alone fail to realize that “aggregate data do not differentiate 
among various social strata.”28 Murray Leaf cements Telford’s belief that “the Punjab 
crisis has not, fundamentally, been a clash between Sikhs and Hindus,” but rather about 
the changing socio-economic conditions in the state.29 Shekhar Gupta states that 
“conflicts that seem completely religious or political on the surface in India usually have 
an ethnic, linguistic, or regional dimension.”30 Rajshree Jetly describes the movement as 
                                                 
24 Tara Kartha, “Terror Roll Back: Militancy in Punjab,” in Tools of Terror: Light Weapons and 
India’s Security (New Delhi: Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, 1999), 167. 
25 Paul R. Brass, “Socio-Economic Aspects of the Punjab Crisis,” Punjab Journal of Politics 13 
(January 1, 1989): 10. 
26 Ibid., 13–14. 
27 Hamish Telford, “The Political Economy of Punjab: Creating Space for Sikh Militancy,” Asian 
Survey 32, no. 11 (1992): 970. 
28 Ibid., 976. 
29 Murray J. Leaf, “The Punjab Crisis,” Asian Survey 25, no. 5 (1985): 498. 
30 Shekhar Gupta, “The Separatist Threat,” The Adelphi Papers 35, no. 293 (January 1995): 23, 
doi:10.1080/05679329508449286. 
 8 
a “result of a multitude of social, economic, and political factors” leading to a feeling of 
alienation among the Sikhs in India.31 
For more detailed and straightforward explanations of the forces at work, 
Gurharpal Singh categorized the explanations for the “Punjab Problem” into five groups: 
conspiracy theories, Sikh nationalism, primacy of regional factors, Marxist 
interpretations, and primacy of national factors.32 Conspiracy theories claim that events 
leading up to the Indian Army’s Operation Blue Star in 1984 were caused by “external 
aggression and internal extremism” hoping to divide India through the use of terror.33 
Although the government’s own position at the time did not detail who the external actors 
were, author Balraj Madhok clearly pins the blame on efforts of “Muslim imperialism,” 
led by Pakistan, to wedge a divide between Hindus and Sikhs.34 Explanations focusing 
on Sikh nationalism claim that the militancy resulted from “heightened sense of 
nationalism within the Sikh community” in the early 1980s as a result of an increase in 
perceived discrimination.35 Primacy of regional factors contribute the rise of the 
militancy to unequal distribution of wealth resulting from the Green Revolution, 
combined with increased unemployment and sidelining of rural youth. Primacy of 
national factors seeks to explain the role of the leadership at the center—primarily from 
Jawaharlal Nehru’s more neutral and accommodative position to Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi’s controlling and interventionist style—and the diminishing role of the Congress 
Party.36 Marxist interpretations align closely with the regional factors assertion and argue 
that conflict was facilitated by the economic disparity between the social classes in 
Punjab resulting from the Green Revolution.37 These interpretations look at effects of the 
                                                 
31 Rajshree Jetly, “The Khalistan Movement in India: The Interplay of Politics and State Power,” 
International Review of Modern Sociology 34, no. 1 (2008): 61. 
32 Gurharpal Singh, “Understanding the ‘Punjab Problem,’” Asian Survey 27, no. 12 (1987): 1268. 
33 Ibid., 1270. 
34 Balraj Madhok, The Punjab Problem: The Muslim Connection (New Delhi: Hindu World 
Publications, 1985), iv. 
35 Chima, The Sikh Separatist Insurgency in India, 6. 
36 Singh, “Understanding the ‘Punjab Problem,’” 1272; Chima, The Sikh Separatist Insurgency in 
India, 5. 
37 Sucha Singh Gill and K. C. Singhal, “The Punjab Problem: Its Historical Roots,” Economic and 
Political Weekly, 1984, 603–8. 
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interaction between the national factors, economic policies in the state, and the role of the 
Indian government.38 
Tara Kartha describes the rise of the insurgency in Punjab in two stages: the 
militancy initially was “created almost entirely due to internal factors” although it 
received external support in the form of funding, publicity, and benefits emanating from 
smuggling networks; the second phase resulted in increased violence as a result of clear 
physical support in the form of weapons from external actors.39 Punjab stood out as a 
problematic region because it moved “into a spiral of violence,” whereas other regions in 
India were contained by the government that were facing similar economic disparities 
and where corresponding grievances were being voiced.40 According to Kartha, similarly 
organized movements in other states—non-border states—such as the Naxalite 
movement in Andhra Pradesh or unrest in Gorkhaland were viewed more as “troubling 
irritant[s]” than as threats to national security.41 Punjab’s geographical location made it 
especially open to external influence as neighboring lands provided ideal locations to not 
only retreat after strong handed response from the state, but as places to become better 
equipped—namely, to receive training and weapons—to take on the government.42  
The factors outlined earlier also do not point to drugs as playing a central role in 
facilitating the Sikh insurgency. However, the question remains: could the spread of drug 
use create similar socio-economic conditions that led to the previous insurgency?  
3. How Drugs Impact Economies 
Illicit drug abuse is a menace to society on many different fronts—its effects are 
primarily felt in the domains of health, public safety, crime, productivity, and 
governance—and places tremendous burden on the “peaceful development and smooth 
                                                 
38 Singh, “Understanding the ‘Punjab Problem,’” 1274. 
39 Kartha, “Terror Roll Back: Militancy in Punjab,” 167. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 167–168. 
42 Ibid., 168. 
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functioning of many societies.”43 The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) 
dismisses the misperception that “income generated from the illicit drug industry 
automatically fosters economic development” due to lack of proof.44 The INCB found 
evidence of short-term economic gains from illicit drugs sales, but there is no direct 
evidence that the economic benefits can be sustained over the long-term.45 On the other 
hand, the illicit drug trade imposes costs on the taxpayers through expenditures on the 
healthcare system to treat addiction, additional burden placed on the criminal justice 
system to counter the threat, and associated costs with setting up social programs.46 The 
Colombian government, for instance, has seen its cost to fight drug trafficking increase 
from $1 billion to $12 billion annually from 1991 to 2011.47 Gathering quantifiable data 
on the impacts of illicit drug trade and subsequent abuse on a region’s economy is 
difficult, but a recent report estimated that cost to be $193 billion for the United States in 
2013 alone.48 Developing nations like India are especially prone to the effects of the 
illicit drug trade and addiction. 
Fabio Mesquita notes that “the developing world is extremely affected by the 
health and social impacts of the illicit drug market.”49 Giorgio Giacomelli agrees with 
Mesquita, and explains that “the drug phenomenon is unique in the number of aspects of 
people’s lives which it affects—the health of the individual, political and economic 
                                                 
43 United Nations, International Narcotics Control Board Annual Report 2013, 1, accessed September 
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development, the safety of the streets and the stability of governments.”50 Singer adds 
that “significant social and health problems” contribute in undermining development 
efforts and “contribute to the maintenance of social inequality.”51 This social inequality, 
usually perceived as economic inequality, can be the catalyst for group mobilization. 
Lama points out that aside from the impact on society, the illicit drug has—in the 
northeast of India—resulted in “artificially high cost economy.”52 Additionally, the 
northeast economies could potentially feel the impact of drugs trade through a decline in 
tourism, and agriculture when drugs such as poppy and marijuana are chosen for their 
profits over cultivating food needed for the nation.53 Punjab could face a similar situation 
if the drug problem is left unaddressed. 
Economic growth and sustainable development are priorities for developing and 
advanced nations alike. However, the illicit drug trade poses barriers and has negative 
implications for economic growth globally.54 Yet, even with resources allocated to 
address the problem, the international system established for limiting the rampant drug 
addiction “underestimates the social, economic, and political repercussions” of an easily 
accessible illicit drug market.55 Furthermore, criminal organizations that run the illicit 
trafficking business “undermine state authority and the rule of law by fueling corruption, 
compromising elections, and hurting the legitimate economy.”56 When a government 
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53 Ibid. 
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fails to provide economic opportunities and security for its population, the government’s 
legitimacy is questioned, and can lead to instability in a region. 
Punjab has seen a recent economic slowdown relative to other states in India. Its 
growth rates from 2013 to 2014 was 5.3 percent, while the states of Bihar and Gujarat 
had growth rates of 13 percent and 9 percent, respectively.57 Vikram Chadha foresees the 
corresponding unemployment resulting from the economic slowdown manifesting in 
social tensions.58 Sukhpal Singh proposes that “poor governance, lack of 
industrialization, poor social sector investments, and excessive focus on agriculture” as 
the key reasons for Punjab’s economic slowdown.59 Of these factors, poor governance 
falls right into the hands of those actors who control the drug trade and wish to exert their 
influence in the political outcomes for the state. Effects of drug addiction in Punjab can 
go beyond the social impacts; failure to address the problem may pose serious hurdles for 
Punjab’s hopes to recapture its claim as the most prosperous state in the nation. Worse 
still, drug addiction can fuel economic instability in the state and possibly provide the 
window for extremist elements to garner support and mobilize. 
4. Drugs in India 
India is sandwiched between two of the world’s most notorious regions known for 
the illicit drug trade, The Golden Crescent and The Golden Triangle, and its porous 
borders in the northwest and northeast present themselves as ideal routes for smuggling 
illegal drugs. Due to its shared border with Pakistan—through which drugs are smuggled 
into India—Punjab, has seen a dramatic rise in drug use. The subsequent discussion 
highlights the rising drug trade’s implications for instability in the region. 
N. S. Jamwal claims that narco-terrorism—“the nexus between narcotics and 
terrorism”—is considered “the oldest and most dependable source of terrorist 
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58 Ibid. 
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financing.”60 According to him, effects of narco-terrorism were felt in the Indian state of 
Kashmir, where Pakistan used the narcotics trade to fund extremist elements to fight 
against Indian rule within the state; estimates place drug trafficking’s contribution to 
terrorism funding for groups in Jammu and Kashmir at 15 percent.61 Additionally, Sikh 
militant groups in Punjab and insurgent groups in the northeast also rely on drug 
trafficking to fund their operations.62 Arun Kumar supports Jamwal’s claims by showing 
that drug profits were indeed used to finance terrorism in the south, northeast, Punjab, 
and Kashmir regions of India.63 S. P. Sinha points to the illegal drug trafficking trade as 
the main source of funding insurgencies in India’s northeast.64 The alarming part, 
according to Kumar, is that only one percent of the total drug trafficking and money 
laundering activities seem to have been detected by law enforcement.65 Illicit drug 
trafficking’s role in aiding organized crime and terrorism is recognized by the United 
Nations Security Council, which called for “redoubling efforts to prevent terrorists from 
benefiting from transnational organized crime.”66 Complicating the matter is a 
transformation of some drug trafficking groups such as Dawood Ibrahim’s gang that 
have, at best, asserted themselves into “the business/logistics end of terrorism,” and at 
worst, resorted to carrying out terrorist acts themselves.67 With the increasing population 
now using drugs, from rich, poor, and middle class families, Punjab’s landscape may 
likely see an increase in narco-terrorism as well. 
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With varying degrees of explanations, including geography, religion, and 
economics for the rise of the insurgency in Punjab in 1980s, it is clear, as Moore argues, 
that the causes of insurgencies are much more complex than they seem at the surface. 
Some scholars have highlighted the need for India to address the drug problem, in the 
context of threats to national security because the drug trade is funding sources for 
militant groups.68 Those looking at the origins of the insurgency and forecasting its 
reemergence believe that the Khalistan movement—aside from some diaspora support—
is unlikely to reemerge, but do not take into account the impacts of the growing drug 
problem in the state.69 Meanwhile, there are reports that point to the social impacts of the 
drug use within Punjab resulting from lack of economic opportunities.70 However, very 
few connect these issues. To that extent, this thesis attempts to determine the possibility 
for the reemergence of separatist movements, and impacts to stability through a declining 
economy with the rising drug abuse and addiction serving as the catalyst. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis hypothesizes that the increased drug trade in Punjab will contribute to 
destabilizing the already declining economy, and subsequently, will lead to political 
instability in the state as institutions required to maintain law and order weaken. 
Furthermore, the competing political parties will likely continue to use drug addiction in 
the state as a means to levy blame onto each other, rather than addressing the core 
problem. Additionally, their inability to deal with the issue due to political divisions may 
further lead to weakening of the state, causing the emergence of more ethnic and religion 
based mobilization. Meanwhile, the Indian government may fail to realize the underlying 
threats to its national security leading to last-minute planning, and execution of a plan 
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weaker than the one required to deal with the consequences of the rising drug trade and 
addiction. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A single case study is used in a comparative method to answer the research 
question, focusing on Punjab, India. Two time periods are considered: first, the Khalistan 
insurgency, to understand the economic and social conditions that contributed to 
mobilization, and second, the current landscape in Punjab is used to illustrate that similar 
economic and social trends are emerging. The extensive scholarly literature written about 
the Khalistan separatist insurgency, Punjab’s economy, and the drug trade in India are 
used to illustrate the current situation in Punjab. These include journal articles, books, 
and reports published by national and international organizations. The wide literature 
available regarding the causes of insurgencies provides a broad perspective of the issues 
that lead to the initial mobilization. The published reports (i.e., by the United Nations) 
provided the needed data on drug trafficking in and around India. Regarding the drug use 
in Punjab (and for comparative purposes in India), relatively few published reports are 
available. For this information, current newspaper and magazine articles provided 
analysis of Punjab’s social, political, and drug setting. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis is organized into four chapters. After the introductory chapter, Chapter 
II is dedicated to explaining the rise and demise of the Khalistan separatist insurgency, 
with special attention to economic and social factors that mobilized Sikhs and provided 
support to the insurgents. Chapter III details the “drug problem” India is faced with, its 
ramifications for Punjab socially, economically, and in terms of state security, and the 
political landscape and how it deals with the drug epidemic. Lastly, Chapter IV provides 
implications for security, concluding analysis, and recommendations for the Indian 
government. 
 16 
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II. PUNJAB: FOUNDATIONAL MOVEMENT AND 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 
Punjab’s drug problem is not unique and at the same time, not a surprise given the 
state’s location next to the golden crescent. However, what makes it a threat to stability in 
the region is its critical position at the center of Indian security and at the same time, the 
central authorities’ neglect of the ongoing grievances from the Sikh community. This 
chapter provides an important historical background of the state including the 
significance of its geographical layout, role in India’s food security, representation in the 
military, as well as the reasons behind its prolonged insurgency in the 1980s that make it 
vulnerable to instability. The current drug epidemic introduces a new threat variable into 
the state. 
A. PUNJAB’S IMPORTANCE TO INDIA’S SECURITY 
Punjab means the land of five (panj) waters (ab); the rivers running through the 
state are Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas.71 It is a fertile region with a large 
amount of land devoted to agriculture. India’s 2011 census estimated Punjab’s population 
to be 27.7 million, comprising 2.29 percent of the nation’s total population.72 It is the 
only Indian state with Sikhism as the majority religion (57.69 percent), followed by 
Hinduism (38.49 percent), and a smaller presence of Islam (1.93 percent) and Christianity 
(1.26 percent).73 Punjabi is the official language of the state; Hindi, Urdu, and English 
are also widely used and are second languages to many in the state.74 The state is 
strategically located in India’s northwest. The state’s borders with Pakistan and the 
disputed territory of Kashmir, highlights the importance of its location for India’s border 
security.  
                                                 
71 Eleanor M. Nesbitt, Sikhism a Very Short Introduction, Very Short Introductions. (Oxford: Oxford 
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Punjab is also essential to India’s internal security as over the years it has become 
critical for the nation’s internal well-being as a major contributor to food security as well 
as the military. Sikhs identify “themselves as a rural, unsophisticated, farming people” 
with Punjab securing the designation as India’s breadbasket.75 The importance of 
agriculture to the state is summed up in a joke that is well known in Punjab: “the only 
culture Punjabis have is agriculture.”76  
Punjab’s agriculture sector is essential in ensuring food security for the entire 
nation. Punjab is responsible for contributing astounding two thirds of total food grains 
and one third of the milk produced in India.77 Punjab’s share of wheat and rice procured 
by the Indian government for food security purposes accounted for 40.6 percent and 26.1 
percent, respectively, for the 2014–2015 fiscal year.78 
Punjab’s importance for Indian food security increased during the Green 
Revolution in the mid-1960s that enabled India to obtain large gains in agriculture output 
using high-yielding varieties of food crops.79 For instance, from 1966 to 1974, in Punjab, 
wheat production increased more than nine percent per year, rice production grew at a 
staggering 18 percent per year, and the total agricultural production increased at six 
percent a year.80 In recent years, both the agriculture and economic growth have slowed. 
Between 1993–94 and 2000–2001, agriculture growth in the state at 2.19 percent per year 
was more than half percent lower than the average in India. Wheat production in the 
1990s slowed to 2.23 percent per year, and rice production only grew at 2.80 percent per 
year.81 Furthermore, between 2002–2011, Punjab’s GDP growth of 6.61 percent per year 
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was almost 20 percent lower than the national average of 7.95 percent per year.82 The 
recent slowdown in its economic growth is not only a threat to Punjab, but India’s food 
security. The drug menace contributes to this problem and needs to be understood in the 
context of Punjab’s contribution to food security. 
Sikhs are also highly represented in the Indian armed forces. They, as a minority 
community, make up 2.29 percent of the Indian population,83 yet are visibly present in 
the armed forces making up 8–13 percent of the total numbers since independence.84 
Robin Jeffrey highlights the significance of the large proportion of Sikhs in the military 
by asserting that “Punjab [had] the makings of a formidable people’s army.”85 Sikhs’ 
high presence in the armed forces highlights the importance of Punjab for India’s security 
considerations, especially because there may be a backlash if Sikhs perceive themselves 
to be discriminated against. Such threats to armed forces became clear in 1984, when 
government forces entered the Golden Temple in order to flush out Sikh radicals, some 
2,000 Sikh military recruits mutinied in retaliation.86 As many as 170 officers above the 
rank of colonel were publically supporting the Sikh insurgency in the 1980s.87 
Furthermore, two high-ranking officers of the Indian army were known to have advised 
the leader of the Sikh extremist group.88 Again, the drug epidemic and its destabilizing 
capacity needs to be understood in the larger context of Punjab’s importance in India’s 
stability, both externally and internally. At the same time, a historical context of the 
insurgency is required as the Sikh community has mobilized at various times to express 
their socio-economic grievances against the Indian central government (subsequently 
referred to as the “center” or “central government”). High number of youth using drugs in 
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Punjab raises the question of their contributions to the military and the state’s economy, 
which is linked to military recruitment.  
B. FOUNDING OF SIKHISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY FORMATION 
The roots of identity-based mobilization behind Punjab’s insurgency lie in the 
socio-economic foundation of the Sikh community. Sikhs have long struggled to create 
their own distinct identity and separate themselves from both Hindus and Muslims in 
India. Some of the demands and grievances can be understood in this context of attempts 
to maintain a separate identity. Perception of attacks against their identity and economic 
discrimination are major sources of grievances between Sikh leaders and the central 
government. Furthermore, because the Sikhs are not a socially homogenous group, any 
social or political influences perceived to be undermining the Sikh identity is at times 
leveraged by extremist elements as was the case with the Khalistan movement in the 
1980s.  
Sikhism’s foundation lies in the 15th century when Guru Nanak (1465-1539), the 
first guru, formed a new monotheistic religion due to dissatisfaction with Hinduism and 
Islam. He believed in equality, rejected idol worship, and disapproved of the caste system 
prevalent in the subcontinent.89 Guru Nanak’s teachings along with those of subsequent 
nine gurus defined Sikhism.90 The five k’s mark the most important and apparent 
symbols for the Sikh community. The Sikhs are required to not cut their kesh—hair; carry 
a kirpan—a ceremonial dagger; wear a kara—a steel bracelet; wear a kacchara— 
military-style shorts; and carry a kanga—a wooden comb.91 The Sikhs view themselves 
as distinct from Islam and Hinduism, and have sought a separate identity since the 
founding of the religion.  
In addition to forging a distinct Sikh identity, the community has “managed to 
acquire a high degree of internal social and political cohesion and subjective self-
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awareness.”92 Nevertheless, this does not imply uniformity, as “the boundaries of the 
Sikh people remain flexible and uncertain.”93 This blurring of lines includes Hinduistic 
tendency of adopting an “inclusive attitude” towards other religions, especially those 
originating in India.94 Additionally, the Sikh identity is complicated due to the “existence 
of cross-cutting cleavages, including caste, class, and partisan affiliation.”95 
In contrast to what Guru Nanak had envisioned, caste remains an aspect of the 
Sikh society; the four major ones are the “Jats, the merchant and trading castes, the 
intermediate artisan castes, and the lower castes.”96 The Jats, primarily agriculturalists, 
comprise majority of the Sikh population making up from 50–75 percent of the Sikhs.97 
Meanwhile, the urban merchant and trading castes and the artisan castes makeup the 
intermediate castes, and finally, the lower castes are placed on the lower strata of social 
life and are referred to as Scheduled Castes.98  
Additionally, within Sikhism there are four sub-sects based on symbolic and 
scriptural emphasis that further determine Sikh sub-divisions. The amritdhari Khalsa 
Sikhs are the orthodox Sikhs who have taken amrit (holy nectar) and maintain all of the 
five K’s.99 The keshdhari Sikhs have not taken amrit, but keep unshorn hair; the 
Sahajdhari Sikhs have not taken amrit nor do they keep unshorn hair, but they mostly 
“identify exclusively with the Sikh religion.”100 The last group comprises of various 
other divisions, which blur the lines between Sikhism and Hinduism, who are considered 
by some orthodox Sikhs as heterodoxical. These sects include the Hindu-Sikh sect like 
Nanakpanthis or “new reformist sects such as Radha Swamis and Nirankaris.”101  
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Over the years, these social and religious differences have played into the hands 
of the radicals by providing cleavages that are used for mobilization. Furthermore, Sikhs 
view their slowly decreasing majority in Punjab as a threat to their identity and culture as 
more Hindus migrate to Punjab. The number of people who identify with Sikhism as their 
religion has decreased from 60 percent in 1996 to approximately 57.7 percent in 2011.102 
This creates an urgency on the part of Sikhs to enhance the differences between Hindus 
and Sikhs. 
C. POST-1947 SIKH IDENTITY AND MOBILIZATION FOR STATEHOOD 
The relationship between the Sikh community and the center in India in the post-
colonial period can best be summed up as sensitive. The politics that emerged during the 
nationalistic anti-colonial phase continued to shape the distinctions between Hindus and 
Sikhs in the post-1947 period and formed the foundation for mobilization for economic 
and political demands.  
The partition of India was one of the bloodiest periods in human history resulting 
in one of the largest transfers of human population as two countries were created; Hindu-
majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan.103 Some estimates place the number of 
people displaced at 14 million,104 while the number killed ranges between one and two 
million.105 Punjab, as border state, became the epicenter of the large migration and 
incredible violence as Hindus and Sikhs moved east, and Muslims headed west.106 
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During the partition, Punjab witnessed dramatic change in territory, but the shift 
in demographics plays a central role in the state’s self-identity.107 In 1947, with the India-
Pakistan partition, Punjab lost approximately two-thirds of its territory and almost half of 
its population to Pakistan.108 The Muslim population comprised half of Punjab’s total 
population before the partition; the balance shifted in the post-partition period in favor of 
the Hindu population (60 percent) while the Sikh population comprised 31 percent of 
India’s Punjab.109 
However, the partition reflected pre-independence Hindu-Muslim elite demands, 
rather than the Sikh demands. Prior to the partition, the Sikh population had a choice to 
make as the British planned their departure starting at the end of WWII. Should the Sikhs 
merge with Pakistan, stay with India, or demand their own independence as the state of 
Khalistan? The Indian National Congress (INC), led by Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal 
Nehru, made the Sikh leaders’ decision easier by making certain promises; the main one 
being creation of a Sikh majority state (Punjabi suba) to secure their unique and distinct 
identity within India’s borders. The Indian government’s reluctance to fulfill this promise 
post-1947 prompted protests in the 1950s that lasted until 1966 when the state was 
formed. The territorial changes ended with the formation of two separate states of Punjab 
(Sikh-dominated) and Haryana (Hindu-dominated) with remaining areas being absorbed 
by Himachal Pradesh. This reorganization created the current Punjab, which is the only 
Sikh majority state in India, reversing the Hindu-Sikh population numbers to 37 percent 
and 60 percent, respectively.110  
The demand for the creation the Punjabi suba was critical in shaping the 
contemporary Sikh identity.111 In the pre-independence phase, Arya Samaj, a Hindu 
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movement, mobilized Punjabi Hindus to register Hindi as their mother tongue and placed 
“emphasis on the Vedic traditions” in order to differentiate from Punjabi Muslims. The 
origins of the language controversy emerged when the Hindus of North India demanded 
“foreign” languages such as Urdu in Persian script and English, be replaced with Hindi in 
Devanagari script.112 Consequently, this resulted in the “crystallization of a Sikh identity 
as the basis of punjabiyat sowing the seeds of a communal identity and politics based on 
that identity.”113 Sikhs mobilized to demand a Sikh majority Punjabi speaking state to 
solidify and protect their distinct identity, and out of fear of being enveloped under the 
Hindu umbrella.114 Interestingly, language, not religion, allowed them to gain political 
autonomy in 1966.  
Language is often the medium through which political expression plays out in the 
linguistically diverse nation. In India, as in other regions around the world, language is 
not simply a means of communication, but also a mechanism by which to organize 
identities “under one umbrella during the emergence of nationalism.”115 The Indian 
National Congress’ (INC) use of language for mobilization against the colonial powers to 
undercut religious divisions in the country underscored the prominent role of language in 
forging separate identities. In Punjab, however, religious divisions solidified through the 
medium of language, which remained in the post-colonial period as a tool for further 
mobilization. 
India is a diverse country with many languages and dialects; these different 
sources of people’s identities can lead to governing difficulties for the central 
government. Language remains at the forefront of political agendas of the central, state, 
and provincial governments.116 Decisions at these levels that provide for the 
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reorganization of territories in favor of a major linguistic group also have to consider and 
guarantee the protection of language rights for minority groups as well. Specifically, in 
India, the quest to make or provide a more prominent status to a single language without 
accounting for desires of the minority population can result in agitations. Sarangi 
describes the complexities of languages in India by pointing out that there were 237 
recorded languages (188 languages and 49 dialects) in the 1881 Census; the Linguistic 
Survey of India conducted over a 20-year period (ending in 1923) identified 179 
languages and 544 dialects; by 1991, there were only 114 languages counted, which is 
attributed to disputes of how the category of “mother tongue” has been defined since the 
Census of 1951.117 
After 1947, the Indian government wanted to keep religion out of politics due to 
the violence of the partition. The government “refused to recognize communities on the 
basis of religion, or to recognize religion as the ground for territorial and administrative 
reorganization,” thereby, catapulting language to the forefront of identity politics.118 It 
could be argued that the division of power in the form of states divided along language 
lines is the reason India has managed to sustain the world’s largest democracy. 
Schwartzberg gives the Indian government credit to this effect by acclaiming “the 
remarkable success to date of the nation’s decision makers in keeping violence within 
manageable limits, in effecting workable territorial arrangements, in forestalling threats 
of secession by powerful linguistic groups, and in safeguarding the rights of linguistic 
minorities.”119 
In independent India, linguistic reorganization affected Punjab greatly and also 
helped solidify the Sikh identity. Nehru’s unwillingness to mix religion with politics 
facilitated a struggle for power in Punjab between Hindus and Sikhs. Punjabi language 
claimed by the majority allowed the people of Punjab to achieve their goal of having a 
state of their own. Sikhs and Hindus of north India, continued to declare themselves as 
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distinct language groups: Punjabi and Hindi, respectively.120 Post partition, with Urdu 
out of the picture, the dispute narrowed between Hindi and Punjabi, with Gurmukhi 
serving as the Punjabi script. Gurmukhi means Guru’s tongue; it is the script that the 
religion’s founding guru, Guru Nanak Dev, used to write Sikhism’s holy book, Guru 
Granth Sahib, therefore, the language is integral to Sikhism. Gurmukhi became the 
religious symbol for Sikhs while Hindi, in Devanagari, was promoted by Hindus, “as 
being the central core of a post-independence ‘Indian’ identity.”121 Specifically, language 
served to further cement the Sikh identity when Punjabi-speaking Hindus declared Hindi 
as their mother tongue in an effort to subdue Sikh domination through reorganization of 
Punjab.122 Brass argues that the opposition against choosing Punjabi as their mother 
tongue by non-Sikhs was “an overt and deliberate political act designed to undercut 
linguistic basis of Punjabi suba [community] demand.”123 Many Hindu Punjabis taught 
their children to “lose the language” as Punjabi was promoted as a hopeless and inferior 
language compared to Hindi.124 The Punjabi suba movement in the early 1960s 
countered with a rejection of Devanagari script and securing “Gurmukhi as the authentic 
script for Punjabi.”125 Due to the prominence of language in creating Indian states, the 
collective narrative of Gurmukhi as the language of Punjab was therefore able to place 
political pressure on the Indian government to grant the people a state of their own. 
Under the pressure of strong protests, the Indian government divided the state of Punjab 
in 1966 via the Punjab State Reorganization Bill.126 The maps of Punjab before and after 
the split are shown in Figure 1. The Punjabi language, of the Gurmukhi script, is the 
official language of the state of Punjab. 
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Figure 1.  Left: Administration Division of India in 1956; Right: The Split of 
Punjab after 1966.127 
Punjab’s creation appeased the major grievance of the Sikhs at the time, but 
subsequent issues over Punjab’s river waters, a shared capital of Chandigarh between 
Punjab and Haryana, and demands for more autonomy led to a long and bloody struggle 
between radical elements in the Akali Dal and the central government.128 These, along 
with economic and religious concerns, were some of the underlying causes that upset the 
Sikh population and facilitated the Khalistan insurgency. It is important to study these 
factors because similar conditions appear to be emerging in Punjab today.  
D. FOUNDATIONS OF PUNJAB’S SEPARATIST INSURGENCY 
The turbulent Sikh insurgency captivated Indian politics during the 1980s. The 
conflict resulted in numerous deaths of innocent civilians and considerable damage to the 
Golden Temple, the holiest of Sikh shrines, during Operation Blue Star launched to flush 
out militants in the temple. In retaliation for the army’s actions, Indira Gandhi was 
assassinated by her two trusted Sikh bodyguards on October 31, 1984. Following 
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Gandhi’s death, anti-Sikh riots erupted in the capital and elsewhere resulting in the death 
of hundreds of innocent Sikhs. The Sikh insurgency that began in the late 1970s reached 
its peak in the 1980s and ended in the early 1990s with negotiations and the coming to 
power of a non-INC government.  
Although the insurgency was expressed along religious lines and center’s 
discriminatory policies against the community, the foundation of the insurgency lay in 
the changing economic and political setting in Punjab. Understanding the underlying 
causes of the insurgency sheds light onto linguistic, economic, religious, and political 
grievances the insurgents fused together in order to secure support. It will also illustrate 
how the government’s response and the resultant violence levied onto the Sikh population 
further served to alienate moderate Sikhs. More importantly, for Punjab’s stability, it 
further delineated Sikh identity as the insurgency and the center’s discrimination became 
part of their identity narrative.  
1. The Green Revolution: The Expanding Disparities and Political 
Divisions 
The Green Revolution, initiated in the 1960s by the Nehru administration sought 
to address the issues of a starving nation. Due to severe droughts in the late 1950s, India 
faced a food shortage, which it dealt at the time through purchasing food from the United 
States through the PL-480 program. Immediately afterwards, India sought to solve its 
food security issues by increasing food production in the country through subsidizing the 
agricultural sector. This policy led to growth in the agricultural sector, especially in states 
that were in fertile areas of the country. Punjab, with its five rivers, benefitted 
tremendously under the Green Revolution plan; the white revolution followed to meet 
India’s dairy requirements. As mentioned earlier, from 1966 to 1974, Punjab saw a 
staggering growth in wheat and rice production that made it essential for India’s food 
security, and making it the breadbasket of India. 
However, like any other major economic policy, Green Revolution did not come 
without significant structural changes. First, Punjab experienced an expansion in wealth 
as well as disparities between wealthy Jats and urban Hindu populations, and poorer rural 
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Sikhs. Second, it brought focus to the unfair central government policies, which 
culminated in the reaffirmation of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (ASR) in 1973. Third, 
it made education accessible for rural Sikh youth, but failed to provide commensurate 
employment opportunities to advance their socio-economic conditions, effectively 
creating a well-educated support base for the militancy. And finally, it brought about 
social changes that threatened the Sikh identity and compelled Sikhs to pursue Sikh 
revivalism. Combined, these factors led to the expansion of radicalism that had to be 
contained. However, it now remains part of the Sikh communal memory and therefore, 
identity. 
The Punjab insurgency can be viewed as two principal conflicts: one between the 
Jat Sikhs and the Indian central government, and the other being a struggle for power 
among the Jat Sikhs themselves.129 
The first is the issue of disparities. Punjab’s economy reflects well in the macro 
numbers, but the distribution of wealth did not commensurate with the size of 
landholdings and across districts in Punjab. It was the smaller farmers (jats) who 
benefitted from this policy as they were the targets of food security policy, therefore 
creating a new competing elite who then clashed with the larger landholders. In addition, 
the poor laborers did not benefit either. Top ten percent of the owner-farmers reaped 
majority of the economic benefits; meanwhile, the “average area tilled by each 
agricultural labour fell from 2.24 hectares [5.54 acres] to 1.75 hectares [4.32 acres].” The 
disproportionate benefits are illustrated by the fact that only 13.3 percent of the arable 
land was owned by 48.44 percent of the farming families, leaving majority of the arable 
land for large-scale farmers.130 The wages for an average laborer fell as their numbers 
grew in the state due to migration from other regions and advancement in technologies 
that displaced them.131 This expanded the disparities in the rural areas and initiated a 
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struggle “for hegemony within the Sikh community.”132 This struggle was particularly 
visible between the well-off Jat peasants, the “traditional Akalis” of the Malwa region, 
and the poorer Jat Sikh peasants primarily of the Majha region.”133 Amritsar and 
Gurdaspur of Majha region were especially among the poor performers, failing to benefit 
from the advancements in agricultural technology.134 Later, such slow growing regions 
became the recruiting grounds for the militancy; “Jat Sikh youths from farming families 
of the Gurdaspur and Amritsar districts” contributed majority of the militants to the 
insurgency.135  
A look at rates of return also sheds light on the impacts of the agricultural 
productions gains. Average rate of return for wheat—the prominent crop in Punjab—in 
1970–71 was 24.50 percent, the return decreased significantly in 1977–78 to an 
astonishing 1.32 percent, resulting in a decrease of 83.5 percent for per hectare income 
for the same crop between 1971–72 and 1981–82.136 These negative outcomes are 
especially important because the Sikh rural population in 1971, which was 69.37 percent 
of the population, saw an overall decline in their income in the 1970s. Meanwhile, the 
Hindus, who made up 66.39 percent of the population, saw an expansion in their income 
as business owners who benefitted from overall growth in the state. Sikhs also depended 
on Hindu merchants to supply modern inputs such as biochemicals and machinery for 
agriculture, and further relied heavily on urban markets, which were also dominated by 
Hindu merchants, to sell their surplus produce. When food prices stopped increasing, 
while inputs prices stayed the same, the imbalance created a clash between the Hindu 
traders and Sikh farmers.137 This disparity produced a sense of discrimination among the 
Sikh population who felt the negative effects of the Green Revolution the most. They 
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viewed the government policies as helping the Hindus, further creating communal 
divides. The insurgency’s leader, Bhindranwale’s speeches highlighted the importance of 
these disparities: 
We are religiously separate. But why do we have to emphasize this? It is 
only because we are losing our identity, and the interest of our Sikh 
leaders who have their farms and their industries at heart have started 
making them say that there is no difference between Sikh and 
Hindu…hence assimilation dangers have increased.138 
He understood the need to appeal to those who had fared poorly in the boom eras.  
Second, Sikhs viewed the interventionist nature of the central government in 
Punjab as a form of discrimination. Punjab has been under President’s rule six times 
since its establishment, two of those times the elected party was dismissed even though it 
enjoyed majority support in the Assembly, illustrating a tendency by the central 
government to confront grievances with authoritarian measures. For instance, President’s 
rule from October 1983 to September 1985 was due to heightened protests against central 
government’ procurement policies of food grains, and against “high costs of agricultural 
inputs.”139 
Demands for autonomy emerged throughout the Green Revolution period and 
were ignored by the central authorities. In 1973, these demands were articulated as the 
Anandpur Sahib Resolution (ASR), which the Sikhs continue to use to complain against 
the central authorities’ treatment of their religious community, although majority of these 
demands are not based on religion. The demands highlight important issues such as 
distribution of resources, Punjabi language, and the Sikh presence in the military.  The 
ASR specifically demands: 
The massive decentralization of power from the center to the states, the 
merger of Chandigarh and Punjabi-speaking areas into Punjab, giving 
control of the Bhakra-Nangal Dam headworks to Punjab, a more “just” 
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redistribution of river waters flowing through the state, giving Punjabi 
second-language status in other north Indian states, the creation of a larger 
airport at Amritsar and a stock exchange in Ludhiana, direct relaying of 
gurbani (Sikh scriptures or religious hymns) from the Golden Temple, 
maintain the policy of merit-based army recruitment, more economic 
facilities for scheduled castes, and various changes in tax laws to benefit 
Sikh women.140 
The crucial points of ASR were centered on issues driving the state’s economy, 
specifically water rights for the large agriculture sector, and around military 
recruitment—another source of economic input for the state rather than religious issues. 
It remains unresolved and a contentious issue. Recent agitations from Scheduled Castes 
to implement a quota for them in the military also challenges Sikh presence in the 
military as they see it as an important aspect for their economy, and wish it to be merit-
based. Any changes that negatively influence Sikh recruitment in the military and 
unwillingness on the part of the central government to settle water rights issues were, and 
continue to be, perceived as anti-Sikh. By the 1980s, the militants used economic and 
political demands laid out in the ASR to further their agenda. 
Third, as the economy expanded, so did people’s aspirations. Education provides 
an example of this. Education rates increased in conjunction with the Green Revolution. 
New agricultural technologies decreased the number of farm labor required—freeing 
children from manual labor and facilitating increased enrollment in schools.141 The 
wealth in the Majha region, however disproportionate, was sufficient to make secondary 
school and college a reality for many youth from Punjab’s rural families. The number of 
students attending college “increased from 35,000 between 1964–1965 to 100,000 in 
1968–1969 and 110,000 in the mid-1970s.”142 By 1974, Punjab at 78 percent, was 
second only to Kerala (96 percent) in percentage of its school-age children attending 
school; the state’s literacy levels increased by 50 percent from 1961 to 1981.143 
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Yet these educated youth were faced with a lack of employment opportunities, 
leading to high unemployment rates among the newly educated demographic.144 Punjab’s 
heavy reliance on agriculture and the inability of both the state and central governments 
to invest in developing other industries failed to provide jobs for the youth—leaving them 
with a sense of discrimination. Schools provided the gathering environment for youth 
from similar socio-economic backgrounds to come together to share and discuss their 
ideas. These two factors combined to allow the newly educated youth to forge a new 
outlook on their identities and the “fairness of the political system” in which they 
lived.145 When faced with lack of opportunities to advance their own social status, even 
through education, these youth viewed the Indian political system as unfair. By the late 
1970s, the dire employment outlook of newly education Jat youth, combined with the 
alienating urban environment in which they attended college provided the reasons for 
these youth to be angry and ready to change the perceived unjust system.146 
Finally, the short-lived riches brought by the Green Revolution also threatened 
Punjab’s culture as there was a visible conflict between “traditional values and the culture 
of conspicuous consumption.”147 By the 1980s, there was a “genuine culture upsurge” to 
counter the “commercialization of Punjab’s culture.”148 The influx of cash led to 
increased “alcoholism, smoking, drug-addiction, pornographic literature, lewd music and 
vulgar cinema,”149 and domestic violence targeting women.150 The impact of these 
destructive forces was especially pronounced among the male rural population—the 
primary breadwinners for the family. Religion provided a “corrective source of values” to 
counter these degenerative forces.151 “Religious revivalist groups found a responsive 
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audience among the rural Sikh population”; their “moral and ideological crusade” against 
these menacing influences on their distinct Sikh identity was widely supported. 
Bhindranwale was at the forefront of this crusade to end “vulgar consumerism and 
casteism,”152 and initially received significant support from women and children, who 
did not participate in the new forms of “degenerative consumption,” but were hard-hit at 
home from its impacts.153 Bhindranwale led an effort to encouraged men to visit and pray 
in gurdwaras and to take an oath against watching vulgar movies.154 The social impacts 
of the Green Revolution in creating support for the militancy cannot be understated. 
2. Politics of Radicalization in Punjab: Sikhs Divided 
In 1978, Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), the Sikh party of Punjab, became part of the 
Janata coalition, the first non-Congress central government in power since India’s 
independence. The SAD party was formed in December 14, 1920 as a task force for the 
Sikh religious body, Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (Central Gurdwara 
Management Committee, or SGPC), at the Akal Takht—a holy shrine located within the 
Golden Temple complex. The Akali Dal is the most prominent political organization 
representing Sikhism and the Punjabi nationalistic ideology.155 The Akal Takht plays a 
central role in Sikh religious and political affairs as it is considered the “primary seat of 
Sikh religious authority and the central altar for Sikh political assembly.”156 It retains the 
authority to “issue a hukamnama (edict) to provide guidance or clarification on religious 
and, sometimes, political matters.”157 
In the 1920s, the somewhat militant Akali movement was successful in securing 
control of gurdwaras (Sikh places of worship) from the British authorities in India 
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through the Sikh Gurdwara Act of 1925, which created the SGPC.158 It is important to 
note that SAD was an integral part of the Indian independent movement since the 1920s; 
its members played an active role in “protests and civil-disobedience programs” 
advocated and led by Mohandas K. Gandhi and the Indian National Congress (INC).159 
However, the Akali Dal remained focused on advocating for the protection of Sikh 
minorities in India and of those all around the world; its core belief is that politics and 
religion are synonymous and one is required if the other is to function.160 Akali Dal’s 
control over the Sikh religious body, SGPC, illustrates the intimate relationship between 
the political party and the religious authority.  
Over time, the party splintered into several factions, but the main political party, 
sometimes referred to as Shiromani Akali Dal (Badal) to eliminate confusion, is currently 
led by Sukhbir Singh Badal.161 The party was instrumental in the formation of a Punjabi-
speaking province, although it failed in stirring up an agitation for a sovereign Sikh 
nation in 1946.162 In 1978, the party became part of the ruling alliance in the center for 
the first time providing it with an opportunity to advance its agenda, but at the same time, 
it led to further divisions within the party and eventually, its participation in the 
insurgency. 
Previously, Akali Dal’s relationship with the INC-ruled central government had 
been largely confrontational attributing to INC’s policies over who would control Sikh 
gurdwaras in Delhi, its attempt to “unilaterally amend the 1925 Sikh Gurdwara Act,” and 
other unresolved inter-state issues.163 By challenging Akali Dal’s control, INC under 
Indira Gandhi had sought to “steal” Sikh constituencies of the Akali Dal. While joining 
the Janata coalition elevated Akali Dal to the national level and created opportunity for 
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the Sikh leadership, it also forced secularization of the party as they also had Hindu 
constituencies. Also, an alliance with the central government forced them to stay away 
from racial identity politics causing a rift between the Sikh leadership in the state. 
Sikh political institutions consist of three main “branches” holding power over 
their respective spheres of influence: the organization wing, the temple wing, and the 
legislative wing. In 1978, the organizational wing was headed by Jagdev Singh Talwandi, 
the temple wing was led by Gurcharan Singh Tohra as the SGPC president, and Prakash 
Singh Badal was the Chief Minister (CM) of Punjab and head of legislative/ministerial 
wing.164 As Punjab’s CM, Badal had to perform under Punjab’s secular politics as he had 
a substantial Hindu electorate, and therefore adopted a moderate approach. Talwandi and 
Tohra—not having to cater to the Hindu population—were “more radical and ethnically-
oriented than Badal.”165 At this time, the Sikh militancy, due to previously mentioned 
disparities, had become apparent and often targeted the central authorities as well as other 
Sikhs not amiable to their cause. 
For the Akali Dal, being part of the central government, presented an opportunity 
to present their grievances. The ASR was reformulated into new economic, social, and 
political demands. Even though the Janata government supported decentralization 
demands laid out in the ASR, in sync with other parties, they saw the militancy as a threat 
of separatism and rejected Sikh demands.166 This happened even though the resolution 
demanded “an autonomous region in the north of India” where Sikh interests would be 
protected and a matter of official policy, but stated that this region would still belong to 
the Indian Union.167 The Akali Dal, in order to maintain its alliance with the Janata 
coalition, did not push the agenda laid out in the ASR. The secularization of the political 
wing then presented an opportunity for other Sikh groups to mobilize using religious 
symbols. 
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The deterioration of the Janata central government in July 1979 brought fissures 
in the Akali Dal. After the government collapsed in 1979, and INC, led by Indira Gandhi 
came back to power, she played an active role in supporting Sikh extremist elements as a 
counter to the Akali Dal. The violence escalated as both the INC and the Akali Dal used 
militants to achieve their political objectives.168 
As the militancy expanded, Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale rose through the 
ranks to become the leader of a Damdami Taksal, a small Sikh seminary near Amritsar, 
“aspiring to promote himself as a leader in the community.”169 He was dissatisfied with 
the broad acceptance of who was considered a Sikh, and thus narrowed the definition 
limiting it to the amritdhari Sikhs only; he further wanted Sikhs to return to orthodox 
ways of practicing the religion and austere living.170 He viewed the Akali Dal as mainly 
representing their wealthy Jat supporters rather than the Sikh panth (Sikh community). 
Indeed, the Akalis pursued a “secular and pragmatic strategy” when they were in power, 
and conveniently leveraged Sikh identity issues when they felt their support was 
waning.171 
The issue that brought Bhindranwale to the forefront and that sparked divisions 
(in what at the time was seen as a lasting Hindu-Sikh political solution) was a religious 
controversy between the Sikhs and Nirankaris, a Hindu-Sikh sect viewed by many 
orthodox Sikhs as heretical. For Bhindranwale, Nirankaris proved to be the “enemy” he 
could use to spread his extremist ideology. As INC supported Nirankari leaders, he was 
able to further his cause by pointing to this as a collusion of the “others.” The Akal Takht 
issued a hukamnama (religious edict) on 10 June 1978 criticizing the support INC central 
government provided to the Nirankaris.172 A series of intensifying clashes between the 
two sides led to CM Badal taking a mediating approach to appeal to his electorate, while 
others adopted the more radical approach to prevent the Nirankaris “from grow[ing] and 
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flourish[ing]in society.”173 The party split into different factions and the environment 
facilitated various other extremist Sikh groups willing to use violence.174 Furthermore, 
these political divisions slowly evolved into demands for autonomy as the Sikh 
population perceived themselves being discriminated against, which often faced a 
confrontational center, particularly the INC who had initially used militant against the 
Akali Dal. 
Eventually, Bhindranwale turned against the INC and compelled others to join 
him in his demands for Khalistan. Once the militant forces seemed to have the upper 
hand, the moderate Akali Dal also supported secession as not to look weak in the eyes of 
the Sikh population.175 Even though the party wanted to take a secular approach to 
resolve the insurgency, stuck in an ultimatum, it accepted the terms set out by the 
militants to ensure political survival. 
The Khalistan movement was not a religious fight at its core, but a political one. 
Religion served to unite certain segments of the population against a common, artificially 
created enemy that sought to divide them. The battle against the common enemy became 
a common identity symbol.  
3. Prolonged Insurgency and Central Government’s Response 
The central government’s actions over the initial phases of the insurgency period 
served to alienate moderate Sikhs. Furthermore, the central government used heavy-
handed tactics, carried out extrajudicial killings of amritdhari (baptized) Sikhs, and 
humiliated moderate Sikhs. According to Gurharpal Singh, around 25,000 people were 
killed, between 20,000 to 45,000 were illegally detained, and the number of 
disappearances remains unknown.176 The center also made several deals during this time 
with the Akalis and reneged on them, which was seen as a betrayal by the moderate Sikh 
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population seeking to calm down the insurgency.177 Instead, these actions by the 
government increased support for the extremists.  
Several incidents point to Sikhs being isolated by the center at this time, which 
led to support for the insurgency. In an effort to contain planned mass demonstration by 
Sikhs in New Delhi during the Asian Games in 1982, the center set up security 
checkpoints and deliberately searched and humiliated Sikhs trying to enter the games.178 
Those searched included senior retired defense personnel and Sikh members of 
parliament (MP), while Hindus were allowed to pass through without any searches.179 
This humiliation turned those against the planned demonstration and those who opposed 
Bhindranwale to join the extremist cause. Shabeg Singh, a major general in the Indian 
Army who later advised Bhindranwale’s forces said that “it was the humiliation meted 
out to him at the Asian Games that prompted him to join forces with Bhindranwale.”180 
To help sustain his insurgency, Bhindranwale received both financial and 
diplomatic support from the Sikh diaspora mainly established in the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Canada.181 Following Operation Blue Star in 1984 that destroyed parts of 
the Golden Temple and killed Bhindranwale, certain diaspora groups “declared 
themselves to be the Khalistan government in exile.”182 Besides the direct financial 
support, the diaspora pushed for and was successful in gaining Pakistani support. 
Pakistan’s financial and military assistance enabled militants to prolong the 
insurgency.183 Punjab’s shared border with Pakistan facilitated the transfer of arms into 
the state with relative ease.  
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Indira Gandhi’s use of overwhelming force to repress the militancy “out of 
existence,” combined with a tired population’s willingness to end the violence allowed a 
level of normalcy to return to Punjab.184 Because of its defeat, the insurgency failed to 
achieve its objective of an independent Khalistan, and was unsuccessful in squeezing 
concessions out of the central government; it left thousands dead with survivors left 
seeking justice. However, the Sikhs showed their displeasure with the INC by voting for 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Akali Dal for the next two decades.  
At the surface, the Sikh separatist insurgency seems to have been caused by 
tensions between minority Sikhs and Hindu-dominated Center, but at its core, it was a 
movement propelled by political competition between the INC and various Akali Dal 
factions using economic grievances and religions divisions for their own gains.185 The 
lack of economic outlook—combined with existing communal divisions—resulted in a 
strong support base for the extremists in the 1980s. Legacies of the Sikh separatist 
insurgency continue to have implications for present day politics in Punjab. Memories of 
atrocities committed against the Sikhs by the central government are still tender and have 
become part of Sikh identity and collective memory of the community. Government 
actions offended moderate Sikhs at home and abroad who did not initially support the 
extremist cause. Furthermore, resources that could have been spent on the state’s 
development were wasted in trying to suppress the militancy. 
4. Post-insurgency and Politics of Punjab 
The Akali Dal party holds the reigns of political and religious power in Punjab 
based on the support it receives for its heavy campaign against federal interference in 
Sikh affairs; it has little direct influence elsewhere in Indian politics.186 The end of the 
insurgency saw the Akali Dal party aligning with an unlikely ally—the right wing Hindu-
nationalist party. 
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Until June 1984, just prior to the Indian Army’s operation Blue Star, “leadership 
of the Sikh agitation had effectively passed from the Akali Dal to the more extremist 
followers of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.”187 A year after Bhindranwale’s death in July 
1985, Harchand Singh Longowal, a moderate Akali Dal leader, agreed on a peace accord 
with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.188 In order for the agreement to be upheld, Longowal 
had to appeal to and gain the support of his opposing colleagues. Thukral explains that 
after much negotiation, Longowal was finally able to win “over his two dissenting 
colleagues, SGPC President G. S. Tohra and former chief minister P.S. Badal” so that 
they could stand as one and run for elections together; unfortunately, political stability 
and compromise did not last because Longowal was assassinated on August 20, 1985 at a 
rally in Punjab by a Sikh militant.189 
In 1986, the Akali Dal party witnessed withdrawal of number of its leaders to 
form a separate party, but the party reunited under the leadership of a former police 
official, Simranjit Singh Mann. However, factions continued to exist and they keep 
Punjab politics divided and, the same time, focused on Sikh community symbols rather 
than other non-secular issues.190 Manjit Singh, point man for the Sikh religious 
leadership, led and failed in his attempts to unify the party with its various non-secular 
factions, which did not include Badal’s group; Mann formed a separate party 
(SAD[Mann]) stating other party leaders’ inability to abide by the agreed upon “Amritsar 
declaration.”191 Internal feud during 1998–1999 resulted in a faction led by Gurcharan 
Singh Tohra to “criticize the BJP-led central government and President Badal’s Punjab 
administration.”192 Tohra started the All India Shiromani Akali Dal (AISAD) in mid-
1999, which “may have contributed to the SAD’s losing six of its eight Lok Sabha seats 
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in the 1999 election”; three years later, the party lost the state poll.193 Tohra and Badal 
eventually put aside their differences and reconciled in 2003, but Tohra died in March 
2004, and Jaswant Singh Mann organized a new anti-Badal party within a month of 
Tohra’s passing.194  
The Akali Dal won eight seats in the 2004 general election as a part of the 
National Democratic Alliance.195 Shortly after the results, Prem Singh Chandumajra, a 
dissident SAD party leader, formed another anti-Badal party, the Shiromani Akali Dal 
(Longowal), “but he rejoined the parent party in January 2007.”196 A month later, the 
party, aligned with the BJP, beat out its traditional rival, the INC, in a closely contested 
election to win the state enabling Badal to reclaim his position as Chief Minister.197 For 
many observers this was a victory for India as it brought Akali Dal, representative of Sikh 
Jats and BJP, represented of Hindu urban constituency together. Some elements of the 
radical groups remain, however. In May 2007, Wassan Singh Zaffarwal, a former leader 
of the Khalistan Commando Force, formed the Shiromani Akali Dal (Zaffarwal) in his 
quest for an independent Sikh Khalistan.198 
The SAD party has been a key ally for the ruling BJP since 1997.199 Although the 
alliance has been around for almost twenty years, its formation, and more importantly its 
long tenure, is surprising given opposing ideals of the two parties. The SAD party is 
rooted in strong advocacy for the Punjabi language and for the Sikh population in 
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Punjab.200 The SAD party, much like the BJP, is forced to operate in “secular and 
democratic political systems of Punjab and India,” and therefore, has to “moderate its 
purely ethnic message” to appeal to a substantial Hindu population in the state.201 The 
BJP was created on the ideals of strong Hindu nationalism and their advocacy for Hindi 
to be India’s official and mainstream language; their position remains unchanged in 
contemporary Indian politics. Despite these opposing views, the SAD and the BJP have 
forged an alliance to defeat their common enemy and opponent, respectively, the INC.  
Historical mistrust of the INC shapes Akali political alliances; Indira Gandhi’s 
order to storm the Golden Temple, violence against the Sikhs in Delhi after her 
assassination, and repeated let-downs by Rajiv Gandhi all prevented a political solution 
in Punjab. The current BJP-SAD alliance is interesting because the BJP advocates for the 
rights of Hindus and believes Sikhism to be a part of Hinduism.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Punjab, as discussed previously, is critically important to India in several ways. 
First, as the breadbasket of India, it provides food security for the nation. Second, the 
state is a testament to India’s secular identity, where a minority religion in the country 
has thrived. Third, as a border state with Pakistan, its security and prosperity are crucial 
for India’s stability. Finally, having gone through a period of prolonged separatist 
insurgency—with resentment against the government’s harsh response still alive—the 
Indian government cannot ignore the rising drug problem in the state which could foster a 
sense of deprivation from the same segment of the population. The negative impacts of 
the Green Revolution are still being felt in the state. Today, large numbers of rural 
Punjabi youth are rejecting manual labor and moving away from agriculture, but are 
having difficulty finding employment elsewhere and turning to drugs. The lack of job 
opportunities has led to several agitations recently for reservation demands in other 
states. A rising number of drug users in the state is compounding the conditions created 
by the state’s already declining economy and threaten its stability. This is especially true 
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because there is growing discontent in the state against the Akali Dal party, which has 
evolved into a party mostly controlled by a single family—the Badals.202 The frustrations 
from a lack of government response to this problem can turn grievances into uprisings, 
which the Indian government is ill-equipped to face. The relevance of pro-Khalistan 
militant organizations provides an opportunity for these elements to take advantage of 
any grievances in the state. The next chapter details how the growing drug use and trade 
in the state has impacted its economy and society. With the presence of on-going 
historical grievances, along with the memory of a violent insurgency, which is blamed on 
the center, the drug epidemic becomes another grievance that is yet to be addressed by 
the Hindu-dominated central authorities.  
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III. PUNJAB’S VULNERABILITIES: NARCO-TERRORISM AND 
DECLINING ECONOMY  
The rise of drug economy is no doubt a threat to societal stability in any given 
state. As illustrated in the previous chapter, what makes the rise of drugs in Punjab 
unique and requires urgent attention is its proximity to Pakistan, its history of instability 
due to the partition, and as well as a violent insurgency that rocked the state in the 1980s. 
This chapter provides the details of the rise of the drug trade and economic conditions in 
Punjab in order to argue that this new threat may once again produce conditions for 
instability in a vulnerable and strategically important state. The economic decline 
provides criminal syndicates with an opportunity to destabilize the region. The negative 
effects on the state’s economy, lack of employment, mounting medical costs, and the 
strain placed on the judicial system can cause unrest among the population that has a 
history of linking lack of resources with center’s discrimination against its Sikh minority. 
This is a critical threat given the state’s strategic location and the importance of its 
economy for the nation’s food security.  
A. INDIA’S GEOGRAPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE IN THE DRUG CIRCUIT 
Punjab’s geographic layout centered between the Golden Crescent and The 
Golden Triangle makes it prone to the illicit drug trade. The Golden Crescent consists of 
Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan and lies at India’s western border, while Myanmar, Laos, 
and Thailand comprise the Golden Triangle sharing India’s eastern border.203  
In a 2014 memorandum to the Secretary of State, President Barack Obama’s 
administration produced a list of 22 major drug transit or major illicit drug-producing 
countries that included India.204 These countries were listed due to a combination of 
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factors that allowed drugs to transit or be produced, even if the “government has carried 
out the most assiduous narcotics control law enforcement measures.”205 The list was not 
a reflection of India’s or any other country’s counter-narcotics efforts or level of 
cooperation with the United States.206 Furthermore, the memorandum illustrated the 
importance of addressing the drug problem in India to secure U.S. national interests. Any 
instability in the region is not only troublesome for India, but also a concern to the United 
States, which is increasingly strengthening its relationship with India to advance its own 
national security objectives in the region. 
1. The Expansion of Drug Routes and Trade in India 
Drug trade is not new to the region. However, the India-Pakistan border became 
an alternative for smugglers after Iran closed the traditional Balkan route through its 
borders after the revolution and Iran-Iraq war from 1980–1988.207 Afghanistan became a 
major drug producer due to a vacuum left in the market and India and Pakistan began to 
serve as significant routes. Previously existing drug routes into the Indian market also 
served as routes for exporting drugs to other countries.208 Even though drug trafficking 
trends seem to have stabilized over the years, India continues to serve as “a hub for the 
transshipment of heroin originating from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region to the rest of 
the world.”209 Due to their proximity to Pakistan, states of Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, 
Rajasthan, and Gujarat provide easy access into India for heroin and hashish produced in 
the Golden Crescent.210  
India’s position as the only licit producer and supplier of opium to the world 
market also makes it vulnerable to illicit drug trade, as it has become a hub from 
trafficking in the past two decades. India accounts for 98% of world’s legal opium 
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supplies.211 This is crucial because with the legal means of production available, there 
exists the capability to manufacture additional opium for illicit purposes due to the 
corruption and political influence.  
Increased number of drug seizures, and drug related cases registered by the Indian 
authorities highlights the expansion of the drug trade in India. The total quantity of all 
drugs seized in India increased an astounding 455 percent between 2011 and 2014, while 
the number of drug cases increased by 41 percent.212 In 2014 alone, various Indian 
agencies seized 1,766.37 kg of opium, 1,370.78 kg of heroin, 108,300 kg of ganja, 
2,280.48 kg of hashish, 14.68 kg of cocaine, 1,330 kg of ephedrine, 54 kg of acetic 
anhydride, and 53.99 kg of Methaqualone and related drugs.213 Furthermore, authorities 
destroyed 2,732 acres of illicit opium poppy cultivation and 3,198 acres of illicit cannabis 
cultivation.214 The only bright spot in India’s drug trends was a slight decrease from 
2013 to 2014 in the number of seizures and the quantity of heroin seized: the seizures 
went down from 4,609 to 4,467, and the quantity decreased from 1,450 kg to 1,371 kg,215 
which may reflect a decrease in the drug trade. Yet, drug smuggling remains highly 
profitable as prices can increase up to fifty times from the time drugs cross into Punjab to 
the time they reach the international market.216  
With India becoming an important market and hub for routing illicit drugs, Punjab 
is its first line of defense and at the same time an important route for opium from 
Afghanistan. However, Punjab appears to be losing the battle to save its youth from 
falling victim to addiction, which then has an impact on Punjab’s economic aspirations. 
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In addition, these drug routes are dangerous for India’s stability as they serve a dual 
purpose for militants seeking to destabilize the region. Narcotics are an important funding 
source for militants. Additionally, the same drug routes allow them to smuggle arms into 
India.217 India’s experience with narco-terrorism is not new; the growing 
interdependencies between drugs and terror maybe facilitating a recurrence of such 
networks in the region.  
2. Drug-Crime Nexus in India 
The nexus between narcotics and terrorism, also known as narco-terrorism, is a 
reliable source of funding for terrorist organizations worldwide.218 As Pushpita Das and 
Saroj Rath have shown, an intricate cycle of interdependencies allows criminal and 
terrorist groups to work together.219 Terrorist groups provide criminal outposts with the 
access to sophisticated weapons they need to maintain control over illegal activities, and 
in return, they gain access to their resources such as funding, routes, and travel 
documents.220 Furthermore, narcotic and terrorist organizations can both use weapons 
and drugs for “military and economic purposes,” facilitating a common goal and 
cooperation between the two groups.221  
India witnessed the devastating impacts of the nexus of narco-terrorism during 
Punjab’s Khalistan insurgency described in the previous chapter and continues to deal 
with it in the ongoing conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. The militants’ need for funding 
helped propel drug trafficking to the forefront in these two states in the 1980s and 
1990s.222 In Punjab, the rise of Sikh extremism associated with the Khalistan movement 
                                                 
217 Ryan Clarke, “D-Company: A Study of the Crime-Terror Nexus in South Asia,” International 
Journal of Business and Globalisation 4, no. 3 (2010): 273. 
218 Jamwal, “Terrorist Financing and Support Structures in Jammu and Kashmir,” 145. 
219 Das, “Drug Trafficking in India: A Case for Border Security,” 5; Rath, “Why Narcotics in India 
Should Be Treated as a Threat to National Security,” 97. 
220 Rath, “Why Narcotics in India Should Be Treated as a Threat to National Security,” 96. Also see 
Emma Björnehed, “Narco-Terrorism: The Merger of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror,” Global 
Crime 6, no. 3–4 (August 19, 2006): 309, doi:10.1080/17440570500273440. 
221 Björnehed, “Narco-Terrorism,” 310. 
222 Das, “Drug Trafficking in India: A Case for Border Security,” 8. 
 49 
facilitated the smuggling of weapons and narcotics into the state in the 1980s.223 
According to Rajen Harshe, Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) used 
drug smuggling to launder “money to meet expenditures on the war” front in Punjab in 
the 1980s; a special cell created within the ISI also focused on using heroin to “facilitate 
covert actions” in the Indian state.224  
Indian sources also suggest that ISI was known to have linked the militants in 
Punjab “with Mumbai-based narcotics-traffic mafia groups” to leverage commonalities of 
narco-terrorism.225 According to Ryan Clarke, D-Company, a criminal syndicate 
originally based out of Mumbai, played a key role in facilitating transfer of militants and 
arms between the Punjab-Pakistan borders.226 The syndicate is associated with Dawood 
Ibrahim, who currently resides in Karachi and is wanted by the Indian government.227 
Dawood’s group solidified smuggling routes for gold and other commodities, which they 
subsequently used for arms and narcotics trafficking once India liberalized its economy 
starting in the 1980s and thereby rendering black market items unprofitable.228 These 
routes played an important role in transferring ISI supplied weapons into Punjab.229 
Some reports indicate that Sikh militants were receiving training in Afghanistan “at least 
before 1985,” which was arranged by Pakistan, and that arms deals took place between 
Sikh insurgents and dealers in Pakistan, both of which were facilitated by criminal 
syndicates.230 The association between D-Company, intelligence of a rival state, and 
radical elements in a country provide an example of how narco-terrorism can destabilize 
a region by aiding extremist elements. 
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Although not situated in Punjab, news reports suggest that D-company may be 
asserting some influence and establishing drug-routes in the state.231 Recent drug-related 
arrests indicate D-Company’s nexus in the state as it has been linked with local drug-
barons in Punjab.232 According to some sources, the alarming part is that the group has a 
wide sphere of influence and is “accused of fostering relationships with politicians, high-
ranking government and police officials,” and business leaders.233 This then allows the 
drug-syndicates associated with an external intelligence agency access to people’s 
representatives in local governments. Punjab is particularly vulnerable to this system as 
its political leaders have historically accused the national government of discrimination. 
Such associations may lead to radicalization, as was the case in the 1980s insurgency. 
The use of drug trafficking routes for anti-India activities became apparent in an 
attack on an Indian Air Force Base in Punjab in January 2016. The gunmen who stormed 
the airbase in Pathankot (less than 20 miles from the India-Pakistan border) were able to 
use existing smuggling networks to gain entry into India from Pakistan. The case of 
Pathankot is especially concerning because, according to some journalists, “nexus of law 
enforcing agencies and the smugglers who operate under the patronage of politicians” 
strengthened the narco-terror relationship in making it easier for the perpetrators to carry 
out the attack on Indian soil.234  
The link between the external players such as Pakistan’s ISI, Lashkar-e-Taiba 
(LeT), and drug traffickers such as D-Company also became apparent in 2008 when 
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Mumbai, India’s financial capital, came under attack for about 60 hours and left 168 
people dead. The attack was immediately linked to and claimed by Lashkar-e-Taiba, a 
group that is associated by some scholars to Pakistan’s ISI235; a claim that Pakistan 
denies. According to Divya Sharma, the ISI aided LeT by securing strategic, financial, 
and logistical support from D-Company.236 Although there is no strong evidence linking 
LeT to the drug trade in the region, Clarke believes that given LeT’s geographic location, 
the group “is likely involved in the [drug] trade.”237 Income from the drug trade provides 
a reliable income stream thereby allowing groups like LeT to adhere to its own agenda 
rather than the one set by their sponsors.238 According to Kambere et al., in 2002, 
agencies in Pakistan were able to net approximately $2.5 billion from about 5000 tons of 
opium, which was used to support organizations like the Taliban and terrorism activities 
in India.239 
In 9/11’s aftermath, many terrorist organizations had their assets frozen through 
efforts led by the United States to clamp down on terrorist financing. Yet, this denial of 
access to their resources advanced a relationship between terrorist groups and organized 
crime; witnessing a demand for their services, groups like D-Company entered into 
partnerships with terrorist groups in various countries.240 Strong links and dependencies 
between organized crime groups and drug traffickers further enable terrorist acts to be 
carried out on India’s soil. The drug trafficking routes allow for other illegal activity such 
as human and weapons trafficking—the profits of which further help to fund terrorism. 
The drug consumers in Punjab are unknowingly funding organizations that seek to 
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destabilize the state. The drug trade therefore, poses a significant threat to Punjab and 
India’s stability. 
Punjab’s alarming statistics point to a rapid growth of drug use, abuse, and 
addiction among the male population, especially the youth. These individuals are not only 
from poor, rural households but also from affluent and middle-class families who are 
educated but turn to drugs absent any career opportunities outside of the traditional 
agricultural sector. The landscape in Punjab is quickly evolving: not only are drugs 
creating an environment where terrorist and extremist elements can flourish, they are also 
hampering economic development of the state that has implications for overall stability. 
3. Drug Trade’s Implications for Punjab’s Economic Growth 
Punjab accounts for approximately 60 percent of all illegal drug seizures in India 
due to the fact that it is a main transport route for drugs coming from Afghanistan 
through Pakistan.241 However, substantial amount of the heroin ends up in the hands of 
Punjabi youth. Opium can also be readily found in Punjab, sometimes processed into 
various illegal substances such as heroin.242 Aarish Chhabra estimates that Punjab’s drug 
addiction rate of 1.2 percent is almost twice the national rate of 0.7 percent and nearly six 
times more than the 0.2 percent world figures estimated by the United Nations.243 
According to another study, the drug addiction problem has especially engulfed the 
Punjabi youth, estimating that majority of the addicts in the state are between the ages of 
15 and 35.244 A large number of youth addicted to drugs has negative implications for the 
state’s economic aspirations. The drug addiction problem cannot be blamed entirely on 
external sources because Punjab’s politicians have been known to use drugs to win votes. 
India’s Election Commission found that during the 2012 State Elections in Punjab, 
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“political workers were actually giving away drugs to try to buy votes.”245 Alcohol has 
historically been distributed during elections to secure votes in other parts of India. Yet, 
S. Y. Quaraishi, India’s chief election commissioner, points out the problem of drug 
distribution during elections as “unique only to Punjab” and of real concern.246 
Although the extent of the drug problem in Punjab is up for debate, as some 
politicians are known to deny the existence of a drug problem for political reasons, it is 
clear that the state faces a drug epidemic and an uphill battle to address it. Complicating 
efforts to address the problem are comments by the state’s ruling party’s prominent 
leader, Deputy Chief Minister Sukhbir Singh Badal. He deflected the negative attention 
on the state by misinterpreting a survey to estimate that only 16,000 adults were drug 
addicts, and as a result, claimed that Punjab does not have a drug problem.247 
B. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COSTS: IMPACT TO DEVELOPMENT IN 
PUNJAB 
Several researchers point to the illicit drug trade as having a negative impact on 
economic growth globally, but Mesquita notes that developing nations are especially 
prone to the effects of the drug trade.248 Drugs can impede economic development and 
endanger government stability by helping to maintain social inequalities.249 Drugs also 
pose various costs to governments, which reduce the funds needed for economic 
development. Costs to treat significant health problems associated with abuse and 
addiction, additional burden placed on the criminal justice system, and various drug 
demand reduction and social programs all consume precious resources. For example, the 
Colombian government spent an estimated $12 billion in 2011 in its fight against drug 
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traffickers250; the drug trade cost the United States’ economy about $193 billion in 
2013.251 Already contending with myriad of development issues (environment, poverty, 
human capital, etc.) developing nations like India face an uphill battle in their quest to 
reach developed nation status. Drug addiction forms another impediment to success in 
one of its most economically important states. 
Limited data is available to determine the costs incurred by Punjab’s government 
to fight the drug epidemic, but results of two surveys provide some insight into the 
government’s response and the impact of drugs on families in Punjab. Punjab Opioid 
Dependence Survey conducted in 2015 estimated that approximately Rs. 7575 crores 
(~$1.1 billion) are spent per year by drugs users to purchase their choice of drugs.252 For 
perspective, this amounts to about 2.5 percent of Punjab’s GDP (~$46.6 billion) for 
2014–2015. Punjab’s gross domestic product per capita in 2014–15 was Rs. 99,578 
(about $4/day)253; this number suggests that households with drug addicts face extreme 
hardship in making ends meet because they are using their income on drugs rather than 
basic necessities at home. At an individual level, a person spends on average Rs. 1400/
day ($21) on heroin, while the numbers are smaller for opium users (Rs 340/day, $5) and 
illegal pharmaceutical-opioid users spend the same amount as an average person’s daily 
income (Rs. 265/day, $4).254 These numbers also highlight that it is not just the poor who 
are being impacted by the influx of drugs into the state. Additionally, money that could 
be infused into Punjab’s struggling economy instead goes to fund criminal organizations 
that benefit from drug profits and are playing an active role in destabilizing society. 
Furthermore, the survey warns that despite significant demand, there exists a “huge gap 
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in the availability of treatment services for opioid dependent individuals.”255 The state is 
unable to meet the demand for the most effective drug treatment, Opioid Substitute 
Therapy, with only 10 percent of patients receiving the treatment.256  
Another survey conducted by the BJP’s youth wing, the Akhil Bharatiya 
Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), in conjunction with a non-governmental association 
concluded that drug addiction was a significant factor in reducing Punjab’s Army recruits 
from 17 percent to an astounding 0.75 percent.257 This finding is especially consequential 
for Punjab because many families in the state depend on military employment for their 
sons and husbands as means to provide for their entire family. This reduced 
representation in the armed forces may further provide the perception that the central 
government is purposely discriminating against the Sikhs.  
The surveys discussed above provide insight into families that are worse-off with 
increasing number of people getting addicted to drugs. Collusion between politicians and 
police for their own benefits is worsening the situation. An unwillingness to address the 
drug addiction problem may lead to further discontent and resentment among the Sikh 
population against the ruling establishment that is seen as neglecting many issues; 
extremist elements are well situated to take advantage of such conditions. 
1. Punjab’s Declining Economy since the 1980s 
Punjab’s economy predominantly depends on agriculture, but it is slowly 
diversifying its industries, as evident by the emergence of the state as a textile-based 
industry hub in India, and claiming a smaller footprint in producing manufacturing 
scientific instruments and machine tools.258 The resultant riches from the Green 
Revolution enabled Punjab to build “weather-proof roads” and “bring electricity to all 
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villages.”259 The positive effects of the increased production also brought an end to 
India’s reliance on foreign food aid and widespread starvation; more crucially, it poised 
Punjab to stake its claim as one of the wealthiest states in India.260 Punjab is highly rated 
for its infrastructure facilities as its “road, rail and air transport network, connectivity, 
construction of bridges” are one of the best in India.261 At 8.26 percent, Punjab ranks 
among the top five states in India for the lowest percentage of the population living 
below the established poverty line.262 Even with such developments, poor fiscal policies 
and government oversight have failed to capitalize on Punjab’s historical agricultural 
success. 
Punjab has slowly relinquished its economic prominence since the 1980s to other 
states. The state’s Finance Minister in 2011 addressed this issue and said, “I must 
mention that on the basis of per capital income, Punjab which was at one time the top 
State in the country has slipped to number four among the bigger states and to number 
eight if all the states and union territories are reckoned. Punjab cannot be satisfied with 
anything but the first place in this regard.”263 Vikram Chadha warns that the “mounting 
unemployment rate…is bound to manifest in social tension,” and that “Punjab is sitting 
atop a powder keg, with frustrations growing amongst the youth.”264 The situation was 
bad enough that it prompted the Indian government to sign an agreement with the Asia 
Development Bank in 2014 for a $200 million loan to help Punjab strengthen its finances 
so that the state could spur economic growth.265  
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The state also lags behind in developing its human capital: it ranks 21st in literacy 
among the states and union territories at 76.68 percent; the state made double digit gains 
in literacy rates from 1991 (58 percent) to 2001 (70 percent), but only increased by 6 
percent to 76 percent from 2001 to 2011.266 Additionally, a large number of its 
population is suffering from diseases such as HIV/AIDS, cancer, and heart disease, and 
other health issues resulting from lack of clean drinking water.267 Furthermore, Punjab’s 
place as the number one state in terms of per capita income has slipped to fifth since 
economic liberalization in India.268 The economic problems Punjab is facing are, 
according to Dr. Jaspal Singh, Vice Chancellor at Punjabi University in Patiala, India, 
“turning out to be a sign of concern and anxiety for all sections of the society in terms of 
prosperity that has been its very hallmark.”269  
Even with the historical distinction of being a wealthy state, since the 1990s, its 
gross domestic product (GDP) has failed to keep up with the national average.270 From 
1994–2002 the state’s GDP growth was 4.32 percent per year, while the national average 
was 6.16 percent per year; maintaining that trend, national average of 7.95 percent was 
almost 20 percent higher than Punjab’s 6.61 percent from the years 2002–2011.271 
Punjab also had the highest fiscal deficit among the major states at 3.4 percent in 2011–
2012. This high fiscal deficit caused Punjab to seek a bail-out from the central 
government so it could provide payments to contractors (Rs. 588 crore, ~$90.5 million) 
in 2014.272 The fiscal deficit also had implications for civil sector employees who 
resorted to illegal means to make money when the government failed to pay salaries on 
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time, further contributing to a culture of corruption.273 The government’s inability to 
foster economic growth, address the mounting unemployment caused by lack of 
investment in new industries, and continuing the practice to heavily subsidize the 
agriculture industry is leading to social tensions and possibly creating an environment 
similar to the one caused by the Green Revolution (discussed in Chapter II) that fueled 
the Khalistan insurgency.  
2. Connecting Failed Policies and Religious Mobilization 
Punjab government’s ineffective policies have directly contributed to the state’s 
economic decline over the last two decades.274 The government’s reliance on agriculture 
as a continued avenue for economic prosperity has failed to pay off, and is threatening the 
state’s stability with rising unemployment. According to a report published by the 
Punjabi University, Patiala, one of the major problems facing the state is a shortage of 
investment in capital formation over the last three decades.275 The ratio of investment to 
State Domestic Product (SDP) was below 20 percent, the lowest ranking among the 
fourteen major states in India, needing at least $1.5 billion to reach the national 
average.276 To exacerbate the situation, the investment-agriculture SDP ratio of nine 
percent in the state’s predominantly agrarian economy has reached an all-time low.277 
Additionally, while the ruling SAD party has made it its goal to build better relations with 
the center, it has failed to “establish a decentralized system of transferring resources and 
power from the State to Panchayati Raj Institutions.”278 These institutions are traditional 
village-level councils heavily relied upon throughout India to govern at the local level. 
The lack of a true federal system within the state further impedes the state from using its 
resources efficiently. Poor governance, heavy emphasis on agriculture, failure to 
industrialize, and scant investments in the social sector has contributed to the slowdown 
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of the state’s economy and the resultant structural imbalance.279 A lack of investment in 
quality and rural education and the health sector has also diminished manpower 
generation.280  
Such ineffective policies tremendously affect the lives of the average farmers. 
Currently, Punjab is dealing with a high degree of agrarian distress; 449 farmers and farm 
laborers committed suicide in the in 2015 due to debts.281 Rural farmer grievances are 
mounting against the state’s “anti-farmer” policies.282 A combination of crop failure, 
unemployment, and indebtedness has pushed this segment of the population to the edge, 
and the negative effects of drug addiction may further fuel the sense of discrimination.283 
A large section of this population is the same segment that did not realize benefits from 
the prosperity of the Green Revolution and subsequently supported the insurgency in 
Punjab. Politicians are failing to take note of the mounting grievances and a split between 
the states’ poor Sikhs and a minority rich Sikh and urban Hindus that benefit from the 
overall consumer sector growth. These new conditions mirror the ones leading up the 
Khalistan insurgency. 
 A number of reasons explain why the state and central governments are failing to 
take serious action against the threat posed by drug addiction in Punjab. The primary 
factor is the political culture of the state that is historically inclined towards ethnic and 
religious platforms rather than taking an issue-based approach. 
Punjab’s political history has largely focused on religion and caste as keys to 
mobilization although the foundations for such divisions are economic as shown in the 
previous chapter. This narrative of discrimination against Sikhs emerged repeatedly. The 
Khalistan insurgency in the 1980s was an example of this narrative. While the state is 
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facing economic and drug concerns, political mobilization in Punjab, whether it involves 
Jat Sikhs or lower caste Sikhs, remains centered on religious and caste divisions. 
Complicating the landscape is that the affiliation between the Punjab’s media and its 
politicians, which shapes the coverage of the issues facing the state. The current head of 
the Akali Dal for instance denies that Punjab is facing a serious drug issue. The danger 
this reality suggests lies in the fact that with increased disaffection at a social level, 
mobilization will occur along religious lines as it did in the 1980s. 
The current political landscape in Punjab continues to lend itself towards 
divisions along religion and caste, especially with the rise of deras, religious centers 
headed by living gurus. Some deras in Punjab are as old as Sikhism itself while the more 
popular deras gained prominence in the 1960s and 1970s.284 Sikh lower castes, who did 
not have any representation in SGPC and administration of holy shrines, created these 
deras to establish their own community leadership.285 In 2016, such patterns continued 
among the Sikhs, as the Akalis introduced legislation to prevent Sahajdhari Sikhs, most 
of whom follow deras, from voting in the SPGC elections.286 This exclusion prompted 
Hindu right-wing groups to initiate programs to “enlighten” and interact at a village level 
with Sahajdhari Sikhs to “return” to Hinduism.287 These efforts from the right-wing 
Hindu groups adds to the tension in the Sikh community, which some orthodox Sikhs 
view as an attack on their community and a deliberate attempt to reduce their numbers.  
The political machinations to gain votes further results in cementing caste and 
religious divides in the state. Deras have emerged as a competition institution against the 
SAD party and are increasingly gaining political influence in Punjab; six of the major 
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deras have influence in approximately 57 of the 117 constituencies in the state.288 The 
Akali Dal’s attempt to garner support from these centers is causing a debate among 
orthodox Sikh supporters, who view the deras as a threat to their religion and distinct 
identity. They also continue to discriminate against lower caste Sikhs who patronage 
these deras. The SAD party’s decreasing support among the orthodox Sikhs is compelling 
the party to diversify its support base, which is surprising because some of these deras 
were at the heart of conflict between orthodox Sikhs and lower caste Sikh communities in 
the 1980s. Majority of the orthodox Sikhs were infuriated when the Akal Takht, whose 
chief is appointed and controlled by the Akalis, pardoned a dera leader in 2015 accused 
of blasphemy; caving to immense public pressure, the Akal Takht annulled the pardon a 
month later.289 Sikhs view this relationship between the Akalis and the deras as 
compromising the Sikh identity for political gains.  
Meanwhile, the Congress party and the Aam Aadami Party, competing political 
parties, are also wooing these deras for votes.290 The deras demonstrated their political 
influence in Punjab’s 2007 elections when Congress was able to win majority of the votes 
in the agricultural belt of Punjab by winning the support of Dera Sacha Sauda in Malwa 
typically controlled by the Akali Dal.291 Political parties of all affiliations, in their 
attempts to gain political favor in the deras, are attempting to elevate the status of the 
lower caste Sikhs. This process further creates religious and caste divisions between 
orthodox Sikhs and dera followers, which is a condition that emerged prior to the 
Khalistan insurgency. Yet, it is the Akali’s political approach that is sidelining real 
grievances that may provide the opportunity for more radical organizations to gain 
support in the state. 
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The SAD leadership’s inadequate response to address the drug menace, 
widespread corruption, and the party’s massive control and influence over Punjab’s 
governance is causing problems among the Sikhs. Punjab’s Deputy Chief Minister, 
Sukhbir Badal has downplayed the number of drug users in the state, and instead blamed 
the Congress Party for “engineering a conspiracy to defame brave Punjabis” and 
tarnishing Punjab’s image.292 This approach allowed the Aam Aadami Party, 
representing the average citizen, to gain a following in the state by promising to rid the 
state of drugs during the 2014 elections in state where, as a newcomer, the party won 
“four out of the state’s 13 Lok Sabha [Indian Parliament] seats.”293 The party’s entry also 
compelled the Congress Party to use drug addiction as a major issue, which promised to 
rid the state of the drug menace in just four weeks.294 Conversely, the SAD party, in 
power since 2007, deflected attention and responsibility, and has denied reports of 
widespread drug addiction in Punjab. Instead, it blames the media for trying to malign the 
state’s reputation. The party’s leadership went so far as to request the censor of a movie 
aiming to depict the drug menace in Punjab.295 Furthermore, the Akali Dal’s apathy 
towards the problem is cemented by the fact that it has failed to commission a single 
survey to determine the extent of the drug problem in the state. This attitude only 
strengthens the public’s opinion that the state government, with the support of its alliance 
with the Hindu BJP party, is purposely neglecting the Sikh rural population that is 
affected by the drug epidemic. 
Under mounting public pressure to address the drug trade leading up to 2017 
elections, and as a public relations tactic, the SAD-BJP government placed a heavy 
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emphasis on numbers. They wanted to increase the number of drug seizures and arrests to 
show “they were doing something without disturbing the drug economy.”296 These 
efforts focused on low-level peddlers and drug addicts rather than the high-level officials 
involved in the drug business. The SAD government also blames the Border Security 
Force (BSF) for allowing the drug trade to occur easily between the borders.297 Since the 
BSF is under central control, it is easy to blame the center’s inability to thwart the drug 
trade. Furthermore, the state and center governments also blame Pakistan for purposely 
using drugs to destabilize Punjab, which is a weak strategy, as Pakistan denies any such 
charges and also to some extent faces a drug epidemic of its own.298  
 Another reason for the lack of attention to the drug problem is due to some 
evidence that suggests that some politicians benefit from it. In 2013, an arrest of a former 
police officer illustrated the politician-drug nexus, and its influence on curtailing the fight 
against the drug menace in Punjab. In an article published by Rajeev Khanna, he 
highlights the important factors of the case.  
In 2013, former DSP [Deputy Superintendent of Police] Jagdish Singh 
Bhola, accused of running a major synthetic drug racket, had confessed to 
funding politicians during the last assembly election. He had named the 
minister Bikram Singh Majithia as a “key mastermind” of the state’s drug 
trade. Majithia is the brother of Harsimrat Kaur Badal, the daughter-in-law 
of Chief Minister Prakash Singh Badal and union minister for food 
processing. Majithia had dismissed the allegations as an attempt to malign 
him. The same year, Maninder Singh Aulakh alias Bittu, a leader of the 
ruling Akali Dal leader, and Jagjit Singh Chahal, a businessman, were 
arrested for drug smuggling. Aulakh reportedly told his interrogators that 
he would use government vehicles for transporting drugs. But the most 
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astonishing is the practice of border pickets being “sold.” The smugglers 
allegedly pay hefty amounts to police and BSF personnel manning the 
pickets to look the other way while they move drugs across the border.299  
Not surprisingly, the Akalis rejected these allegations. Even though the extent of a 
politician’s involvement is difficult to establish, according to Dr. Pramod Kumar, 
Director of the Institute of Development and Communication (IDC), it is happening 
“across parties and at all levels.”300 Kumar’s colleague, Dr. P.S. Verma agrees that the 
drug trade would not flourish without political patronage.301 An IDC report in 2008 
connected drug trade-politician nexus to the police as well. According to the report, the 
relationship was so strong that police officers’ posts were “routed through some big 
names in the drug business.”302 The report also referred to a Punjab minister and several 
high-ranking Punjab Police officers as personnel “who are more aggressive drug dealers 
than the conventional traders.”303 With a close relationship with drug smugglers and 
politicians, it is no surprise that the drug menace is being down played by both the SAD 
party and the BJP. Public’s perception that the ruling SAD party is supported by the 
center’s BJP party in destroying Punjab’s Sikh youth combined with historical memories 
of discrimination is a dangerous combination for this critical state.  
The state and center governments’ inaction to curb the growing drug addiction is 
a threat to Punjab’s stability. Religious and caste narratives in Punjab politics are a 
dangerous current and historical variable that overshadow the declining economy, 
unemployment, and the growing drug problem. Sikhs have a history of viewing such 
issues as discrimination against them. The state and central authorities’ negligence in this 
matter is detrimental. Sociologist Ranvinder Singh Sandhu, argues that the reason drugs 
keep “coming back at the state government is because of its refusal to address the 
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prevalence continuing instead to treat it as a political issue.”304 For their own benefits, 
politicians across party lines refuse to focus on drug demand reduction, or addressing 
underlying economic conditions leading to drug use. Furthermore, instead of addressing 
the problem, the blame game between the state, center, and Pakistan over the drug 
epidemic has become the central issue among politicians and the one primarily reported 
by the media. The media is the one avenue used to educate and inform the public. 
However, in India and especially in Punjab, the media, much like most other government 
functions, is controlled by politicians. For instance, Ajit, Punjab’s main newspaper is 
affiliated with the Akali Dal and Punjab Kesari is associated with the Hindu Punjabis.305 
Such links deprive the public of the facts they need to hold officials accountable as the 
media becomes a representation of particular political segment. 
C. PUNJAB’S RISING DRUG ADDICTION AND DECLINING ECONOMY: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL STABILITY 
Punjab currently faces economic and social issues that underlie the drug menace 
facing the state. These underlying conditions are similar to the ones faced by the state in 
the 1970s, which then led to an insurgency in the 1980s. Unequal distribution of the 
Green Revolution leading to cleavages in different classes of Jat Sikhs enabled 
Bhindranwale to place political pressures on the Akali Dal in an agitation against the 
central government.306 Bhindranwale attracted support mainly from woman and children 
who witnessed the males in the household succumb to alcohol and drug addiction.307 
Furthermore, rural Sikhs supported the cause because they wanted to counter the impacts 
of “degenerative forms of capitalist modernization,” which they viewed as affecting the 
Sikh way of life and an attack on their distinct identity.308  
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For Punjab, a number of other factors and recent events threaten to come together 
to fan similar ambers of discontent. The Akali Dal party has slowly transformed into a 
family-run business absent any political opposition.309 The Akali Dal’s dismal 
agricultural policies have resulted in large number rural Jat farmers committing suicide, 
and a majority suffocating under large amounts of debt. The farmer associations have 
portrayed the SAD party, which claims to be the champion for farmers, as an anti-farmer 
party. The party’s inability to provide demanded compensation to farmers when a pest 
destroyed their genetically modified crops resulted in widespread agitations targeted at 
the government.310 Furthermore, recent events highlighting the inability of the police to 
hold accountable individuals responsible for several deaths, allegedly resulting from 
accidents involving buses owned by the Badals’ transportation companies, has left a 
majority of the population angry and frustrated.311  
The collective perception is that not only the Badals but their minions are also 
above the law.312 Relating to sectarian politics, the Akali Dal failed to bring to justice 
individuals accused of desecrating the Guru Granth Sahib at several places, instead, they 
deflected the blame at Pakistan for trying to cause communal tensions in the state.313 The 
administration further angered Sikhs by pardoning Gurmeet Ram Rahim Singh, leader of 
the Dera Sacha Sauda, charged with blasphemy in 2007.314 Sikhs viewed the pardoning 
as a political ploy by the Akali Dal to gain votes in the upcoming elections at the expense 
of Sikh identity. These two events—pardoning of Gurmeet Singh and the desecration of 
Granth Sahib—were fused together in the public eye, and serve to further divide the Sikh 
population in the state. For the first time, temporal control also became an issue between 
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the Panj Pyare, “the chosen five who initiate Sikhs into the Khalsa Panth,” and SGPC, 
the temporal authority controlled by the Akali Dal and historically used to garner Sikh 
votes.315 The SGPC executive committee suspended four of the five members for “out-
stepping their jurisdiction” when the Panj Pyare disagreed with the decision to pardon 
Gurmeet Singh.316 These tensions are adding to Sikh grievances against the ruling party 
in the state. To rally supporters, Bhindranwale successfully highlighted injustices, 
perceived or otherwise, against the Sikhs by the ruling Congress party. The Akali 
approach to politics in Punjab may soon allow the entry of another charismatic leader 
promising to secure not only the Sikh identity, but also to bring prosperity back to 
Punjab. Drug epidemic and its routes from Pakistan add to the vulnerabilities the state 
currently faces. In fact, the current setting in which the public is increasingly aware of the 
issue without resolution adds to the problem as it seeks control of the setting. 
Sikhs have not forgotten the Operation Blue Star and the aftermath in Delhi 
during the anti-Sikh riots, justice for which many Sikhs are still awaiting today. These 
sentiments together with unresolved demands laid out in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, 
current plight of rural farmers in Punjab, the main engine powering its economy, lack of 
economic development, a fear of losing the Sikh identity, compounded by drug addiction 
and a real possibility of losing an entire generation to drugs are the perfect storm Punjab 
has seen before. With the right trigger, perhaps from external actors or through sustained 
negligence on the part of state or central governments, the current environment in Punjab 
is set to pose a real threat to stability in the region.  
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis examined the current social and political landscape in the Indian state of 
Punjab and the role drug trafficking and addiction are playing in shaping the state’s 
environment. The main objective was to uncover the critical role drugs are playing in 
creating an environment that facilitates an opening for external elements or domestic 
extremists to take advantage of current economic grievances by conflating them with 
religious discrimination to destabilize the region. To determine this link, the thesis analyzed 
the conditions leading up to the Khalistan insurgency of the 1980s in order to illustrate the 
similarities between that period and the current socio-economic conditions in Punjab. Is the 
environment conducive for another insurgency or mass mobilization? The findings are 
summarized in subsequent sections that show 1) the role Punjab plays in ensuring India’s 
security, 2) the conditions that led to the Khalistan insurgency and how the Indian 
government responded, 3) the current socio-economic conditions that are similar to the 
setting that led up to the Khalistan insurgency, 4) a case study illustrating Mexico’s drug 
problems and lessons it provides for Punjab to address the drug epidemic, 5) driving factors 
of instability in Punjab and finally, 6) policy recommendations for the state and central 
governments. 
A. WHY PUNJAB MATTERS FOR INDIA’S SECURITY 
Punjab is a crucially important state in the Indian union and potential unrest in the 
state has tremendous implications not only for India, but also for regional stability in South 
Asia. Punjab is a strategically located state sharing its borders with Pakistan and the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir. India and Pakistan have fought four wars since their independence, 
while in Kashmir, tensions between a robust separatist movement and the central 
government are at an all-time high. The Green Revolution helped Punjab gain its title as 
India’s breadbasket as it provides India with food reserves the nation relies on for its food 
security. Furthermore, Punjab has historically provided more than its share of recruits to the 
Indian military, thereby providing military security for the nation. These factors combined 
with Punjab’s violent and prolonged period of insurgency that lasted from the late 1970s to 
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the early 1990s, highlight the importance of Punjab’s stability to India and the surrounding 
region. 
During the insurgency, the state became the setting for a protracted battle between 
the central government and a strong Khalistan separatist movement led by Sikh 
extremists, covertly supported by Pakistan. With a history of tense relations between the 
two nations, elements in Pakistan, with the aid of Indian-based criminal syndicates, were 
able to support and sustain the insurgency in Punjab, also highlighting its strategic 
location.317 Punjab slowly recovered from the insurgency’s aftermath, but a feeling of 
resentment against the central government’s heavy-handed tactics used to end the 
insurgency is still alive among the Sikh population at home and the large Sikh diaspora.  
Punjab’s political institutions also continue to harbor a political setting in which 
political campaigns appeal to pre-existing religious and ethnic divides no matter what the 
real concerns are. In this setting, the alarming increase in drug use and addiction rates 
during an economic declining period is a threat to regional stability in this important 
region, enhancing an environment conducive to another insurgency or anti-center mass 
mobilization. The inadequate, if at all visible, response from the state and central 
governments is only adding to the resentment and perceived discrimination that Sikhs 
feel is targeted at destroying their minority religion and distinct identity. Punjab’s 
strategic location, relative economic decline, a historical insurgency, and the growing 
drug problem create a security intensive environment which has implications for rest of 
India and surrounding regions. Punjab’s vulnerability to external influence increases the 
chances of instability and highlights the urgency for government action to address current 
grievances in the state. A review of conditions that led to the Khalistan insurgency in the 
1970s is useful to compare with the current landscape in Punjab, and to highlight 
similarities suggesting a possibility of renewed tensions in the state. 
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B. THE KHALISTAN INSURGENCY AND THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT’S 
RESPONSE 
The Khalistan insurgency, starting in the late 1970s and ending in the early 1990s, 
was a drawn out battle between the Indian government and Sikh separatist who aimed to 
turn Punjab into an independent Sikh nation. At its core, the insurgency’s rise was 
facilitated by the changing economic and political landscape in Punjab. India’s quest to 
address its food security issues in the 1950s led it to invest in new agricultural technologies 
targeting fertile regions in the country. Punjab’s access to a reliable water supply through 
its five rivers enabled the state to thrive from the agricultural revolution. The tremendous 
increase in wheat and rice production allowed Punjab to play a crucial role in meeting 
India’s food requirements and stake its claim as the country’s breadbasket.  
 The structural changes that accompanied the Green Revolution expanded wealth in 
already well-off Jat communities and urban Hindu populations, but also increased 
disparities between them and poorer rural Jat Sikhs as shown in Chapter II. These changes 
directed attention to the central government’s unfair policies, resulting in the reaffirmation 
of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (ASR) in 1973. The newfound wealth also made 
education accessible to rural Sikhs, but the failure of the state government to create 
industries capable of providing jobs to the youth seeking to advance their socio-economic 
status disenfranchised a substantial segment of the population. Finally, the Green 
Revolution ushered in social changes affecting especially the rural male population who 
were the primary breadwinners of many households. They became addicted to drugs, 
increased alcohol consumption, and took enjoyment in lewd music and even led to 
increased domestic violence against women. These negative outcomes were in direct 
contrast to the tenets of Sikhism, and consequently, the religion provided a source of 
corrective values. Bhindranwale, the insurgency’s charismatic leader, was able to use his 
crusade against these degenerative forces to gain support and place pressure on the ruling 
political party to join him in his cause. Additionally, Sikh extremists successfully merged 
religious and linguistic grievances with political and economic grievances to gain Sikh 
support. The central government’s harsh response to crush the insurgency further served to 
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disenfranchise moderate Sikhs and made it possible for the insurgency to become part of 
the Sikh identity and collective memory of the community. 
The central government used overwhelming force in order to put an end to the 
violent Khalistan insurgency and restore law and order in Punjab. These tactics targeted 
Sikhs, and in the process, thousands of Sikhs were killed, many more illegally detained, 
and an unknown number disappeared without cause. The insurgency’s defining moment 
came when the Indian Army entered the Golden Temple to flush out Sikh extremists. In the 
operation, the most sacred Sikh place of worship was severely damaged and hundreds of 
innocent pilgrims died in the crossfire between the army and the militants entrenched in the 
temple. This single action cemented Sikhs’ belief that the government was out to destroy 
their religion and distinct identity. The communal violence targeting Sikhs following Indira 
Gandhi’s assassination and the inadequate response by the central government to hold 
accountable those responsible for instigating the violence further focused the spotlight onto 
the Sikhs’ minority status in India. However, the central government’s win over the 
insurgency left core grievances, as outlined in the ASR, unaddressed. More critically, rather 
than a reconciliatory approach, the modern Sikh identity and collective memory of the 
community is shaped by a sense of being beneficiaries of discriminatory practices 
implemented by the central government and memories of atrocities committed against their 
minority population. This perspective is prescient given the similarities between Punjab’s 
current landscape and the one leading up to the Khalistan insurgency. Many Sikhs continue 
to feel that neglect by the center regarding their concerns lies in religious differences. 
C. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN INSURGENCY AND PUNJAB’S CURRENT 
LANDSCAPE 
As illustrated in Chapter III, Punjab’s current political economy is in a state of 
disarray and mirrors conditions leading up to the separatist insurgency. The drug 
epidemic adds to the economic decline by impacting the youth who are the state’s future 
workers and entrepreneurs. At the same time, drug trafficking provides networks for 
potential radicals, especially given its borders with Pakistan, which has harbored Sikh 
radicals the past. The tense relationship between India and Pakistan maintains that 
potential. 
 73 
The state’s aggregate economic indicators during the 1980s insurgency period 
placed Punjab towards the top or at least in the same category as other rich states in India, 
but vast differences in income generation were present between rural and urban 
populations. Currently, the state’s declining economy compared to other Indian states and 
an absence of hope for a brighter future has divided the population once again. The small 
rural farmer is once again the most impacted by the state’s over-reliance on agriculture 
and its government’s dismal record of investing in developing other industries. The rising 
drug use and addiction among the youth contributes to the declining economy and 
discontent among the Sikh population. Instead of this segment becoming productive 
contributors to the economy, they turn to drugs absent any employment opportunities.  
The drug problem also threatens destabilizing social changes that Punjab has 
witnessed before. Rural families are heavily impacted by the drugs as the primary wage 
earners yield to addiction, significantly decreasing a household’s ability to make ends 
meet. Drug addiction is also negatively impacting cultural and Sikh ethical values 
through its degenerative forces, a trend that Sikh extremist leader Bhindranwale used to 
mobilize his support. Furthermore, politicians continue to mobilize similar identity based 
techniques that led to the insurgency in Punjab.  
Currently, the Sikh political institutions in Punjab are controlled by a single 
family, the Badals, viewed by majority of the population in the state as self-serving, 
skillful in disregarding grievances, and a puppet government for the center, the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP). There are also reports of high-ranking government officials involved 
in the drug trade, which is viewed by Sikhs in Punjab as a threat to their community that 
is difficult to resolve as the ruling Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) party is backed by the 
center, led by the BJP.318 This perception is reinforced by several incidences including 
the SAD party pardoning Gurmeet Ram Rahim, accused of blasphemy, the party’s 
reluctance to bring to justice people responsible for desecrating the Guru Granth Sahib, 
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and asserting the party’s temporal authority to undercut religious figures within the 
Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC).  
To further create wedges between the population in Punjab, during the current 
state elections, politicians from the three main contending parties have invoked the time-
honored tradition of mobilizing people along religious and ethnic lines. Sikhs especially 
view the SAD party’s pursuit for political gains of sects considered as being heretical by 
orthodox Sikhs as betraying their pledge to protect the Sikh faith. The sidelining of Sikh 
grievances by the SAD party was partly the platform that enabled Bhindranwale to rise to 
power, and could facilitate another such leader or extremist elements to, once again, gain 
popular support to destabilize the state. The similarities between the current situation in 
Punjab and the insurgency period with the added danger of mounting drug trafficking and 
addiction suggests consequences for stability in the region. 
The striking similarity between the current landscape in Punjab and the one 
leading up the Khalistan insurgency cannot be overlooked. In a setting that continues to 
rely on political mobilization through identity symbols, economic and social instability is 
easily connected to charges of discrimination. The rural Sikh population views the lack of 
effort, both on behalf of the state and the central governments, to curb the drug problem 
as continued discrimination against their community in India. Although the population’s 
underlying reasons for eradicating the drug epidemic are economic, turning these 
grievances into a case for religious discrimination may not be too difficult for elements 
willing to once again demand a separate Sikh nation. For these reasons, the government’s 
inability or disinterest in curbing the drug trade may lead to instability in Punjab, and 
consequently have regional implication for stability in South Asia. The case of Mexico 
provides some insight into how the drug trade, if left unaddressed, can flourish and 
develop to pose a significant threat to governments and economic aspirations for 
developing nations.  
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D. THE CASE OF MEXICO: DRUG NETWORK CHALLENGES AND 
LESSONS FOR PUNJAB 
Mexico’s war on drugs is a prime example of how things can spiral out of control 
if the drug trade is not addressed using a suitable approach in a timely fashion. Mexico’s 
experience with fighting the drug trade also highlights facilitating factors for the drug 
trade, such as corruption, which Punjab also faces. Lessons from Mexico suggest that a 
“war on drugs” should entail a concerted effort of reducing drug demand, fighting 
corruption, and holding politicians accountable, rather than a focus on prosecuting low-
level peddlers and users.  
The Mexican government is entrenched in a long and bloody war against drugs 
and drug cartels, which resulted in hundreds of thousands deaths and numerous 
disappearances. The Mexican government estimates that between 2007–2014 “more than 
164,000 people were victims of homicide,” and some 26,000 people remain missing since 
2007319; estimates by national newspapers, Reforma and Milenio, attribute between 34 
and 42 percent of these deaths to the drug war.320 Both government and criminal forces 
are accused of committing atrocities against innocent persons and committing human 
rights violations in the country.321 The war on drugs diverts precious resources from 
developing industries and creating employment opportunities, which impacts Mexico’s 
economy. The Institute for Economics and Peace estimates that “the economic cost of 
violence, including the opportunity cost” at $134 billion, constituting about 13 percent of 
Mexico’s GDP; this translates to roughly “two months of wages for the average Mexican 
worker.”322 Meanwhile, governmental spending to contain the violence since 2007 has 
risen to a staggering twelve percent per year, much higher than spending on education at 
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seven percent and average government spending increase of nine percent per year.323 
Furthermore, a declining conviction rate for homicide rates since 2007 and overcrowded 
prisons also point to “an overstretched judicial system” unable to keep up with the 
overwhelming violence.324 Maria Celio Toro, a Mexican scholar, noted that the 
“Mexican attorney general’s office has basically become an antidrug law enforcement 
agency,” leaving little time to address everyday judicial needs of the people.325 A number 
of factors molded Mexico’s response to the growing drug trade in the country, but none is 
more crucial than the involvement in the drug trade by those entrusted to protect the 
public from the menace; similar allegations are also made against police and politicians 
in Punjab.  
The drug trade in Mexico occurs because authorities there allow it, and because 
the supply from Mexico meets the growing demand for drugs in the United States. Helen 
Redmond points to the “entrenched layer of federal, state, and local government and law 
enforcement officials” who facilitate the drug trade because they profit from and depend 
on “cartel cash bribes, known as the ‘corruption tax.’”326 Bribes of $1 billion per year 
account for the corruption tax paid to the municipal police alone, while cocaine 
traffickers pay about $500 million per year in bribes to keep their business running.327 
With such sheer amounts of money that circulates in the drug trade, even well-intentioned 
personnel can get caught up in corruption rings to facilitate the drug trade.328 There are 
numerous examples of involvement in the drug trade of senior politicians, police officers, 
judges, military personnel, and even Customs and Border Patrol officers responsible for 
protecting the US-Mexico border.329 Corruption’s criticality in permitting the drug trade 
to function is echoed by Drug Enforcement Administration’s top fifty informants when 
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they said that “the most important factor for running a drug business” was corruption.330 
Consequently, Mexican “states with the highest levels of violence also have the highest 
levels of perceptions of corruption, particularly among the police.”331 Furthermore, with 
increasing drug-demand in the US, routes through Mexico provide a viable method to 
meet the demand. Drug cartels will meet this demand one way or another, it just so 
happens that widespread corruption in Mexico provides the cartels with an easy 
mechanism to meet the demand. While corruption certainly facilitates the drug trade, a 
declining economy and lack of development also pushes people into the drug trade. 
Again, along with corruption, Punjab also confronts a declining economy and lack of 
industrial development. 
The combined effects of a declining economy and the presence of drug trafficking 
organizations is a dangerous combination that limits a government’s efforts to improve 
the economic situation of its people. Drug trafficking organizations make the 
government’s task more difficult by creating employment opportunities for people in 
rural areas and through this process, compel them to become dependent on the drug trade 
for their livelihood. International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) dismisses the notion 
that “income generated from the illicit drug industry automatically fosters economic 
development” due to lack of proof.332 However, there is evidence that drug trade has 
some positive impacts in developing “small and less diversified rural communities” 
where drug money is sometimes the only source of income, employment, and 
investment.333 Absent other employment opportunities, drug cartels can provide incomes 
for rural populations and therefore, undermine efforts for legitimate and safe economic 
growth. The drug business in Mexico directly employs between 200,000-300,000 people 
who earn a living by growing drug crops, while the number increases considerably when 
jobs such as “transportation, security, banking, and communication” supported by the 
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drug trade are factored in.334 The drug economy is especially pronounced when the 
formal economy fails to provide adequate wages and employment to help make ends 
meet.335 However, the drug trade also results in drug addiction and destruction of social 
structures. This dynamic suggests the imperative for governments to provide economic 
opportunities for its people or else risk contributing to the drug trade by diverting human 
capital to benefit organized crime. To prevent this reliance on drug cartels for 
employment, the Mexican government started a war on drugs in 2006, but the surprising 
part is that Mexico’s war on drugs has actually been, as Redmond describes it, “a grisly 
failure.”336 A look at how this war on drugs has backfired has implications for Punjab’s 
approach towards the drug problem. 
The drug war in Mexico focused entirely on defeating organized crime and the 
drug traffickers rather than addressing “pervasive poverty, unemployment, and economic 
inequality” that allow the drug trade to survive.337 Andreas asserts that the drug trade has 
actually thrived since Mexico intensified its efforts to control the drug trade.338 This 
transpired because the level of corruption “often depend[s] on the intensity of the drug 
enforcement effort[s].”339 The requirement for corrupt government officials or those 
charged with enforcing laws increases with increased pressure on drug cartels.340 
Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltzman generalized this notion by stating that increased 
enforcement creates “incentives to invest in corruption and manipulation of the 
deterrence agencies themselves.”341 This trend also creates fissures and results in 
violence between those genuinely trying to go after the criminals and those in the 
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government benefiting from the drug trade through bribes.342 Those who try to expose 
politicians or other powerful people involved in the drug trade can be assassinated.343 
Despite good intentions, the war on drugs has essentially encouraged corruption, which 
facilitates the drug trade. Mexico provides a prime example of why a war on drugs as 
implemented in Mexico may not be the correct approach in Punjab because the state faces 
similar issues to ones in Mexico. A similar approach to address the drug menace in 
Punjab may also lead to increased corruption within law enforcement and political 
organizations that can bolster the drug trade and facilitate external elements’ entry into 
Punjab. 
E. DRIVING FACTORS OF INSTABILITY IN PUNJAB 
Punjab’s setting is unique, therefore, lessons from Mexico need to be understood 
in the context of Punjab’s history. A rising drug trade and its impacts to an already 
declining economy, high levels of corruption, and a history of an insurgency supported 
by Pakistan all pose a unique threat to Punjab’s stability. Punjab has a declining 
economy, especially in rural areas, with little investment for development, and the state 
also faces high levels of corruption. There are accusations of politician involvement in 
the drug trade; the Border Security Force (BSF) and Punjab police are also implicated in 
facilitating the drug trade, and little is being done to reduce drug demand. Unlike Mexico, 
who has a friendly neighbor, for India, elements seeking to destabilize Punjab reside 
within Pakistan. The presence of extremist elements close to its border magnifies the 
drug-crime nexus for Punjab and further increases chances of instability in the state. If 
left unaddressed, the drug problem in Punjab may facilitate conditions prime for external 
sources or extremist elements within the state to appeal to grievances to gain support and 
through this process, present a genuine challenge for the state and centeral governments. 
The Indian and Punjab governments can undertake initiatives now to prevent such 
challenges from arising in the first place. The recent election of Indian National Congress 
party in Punjab may provide the opportunity for it to deliver on its campaign promise to 
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rid the state of the drug menace, but it is unclear whether the party will be able to bypass 
identity politics. If the Congress party fails to address the drug problem then the people 
may not look for a political solution, but perhaps be more than willing to support 
extremist ideology. This new development further highlights the need for immediate 
action to address the core grievances in Punjab. 
F. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis illustrated Punjab’s importance to India and its role in maintaining 
regional stability in a number of ways. To maintain this stability, the central and state 
governments need to understand the devastating impacts the growing drug problem may 
pose in the region. Bhindranwale’s rise to power was facilitated by the state 
government’s lack of effort to address growing grievances in the state, and through the 
process, Punjab’s politicians were forced to join his cause. If the current politicians want 
to stay in power, they need to put forth a genuine effort to address the growing drug 
problem rather than to deflect responsibility. In a quest to hold onto power, the SAD 
party continued to forgo opportunities to appease its constituency through concerted 
efforts to grow the economy and address the drug epidemic, and the people held them 
accountable by voting for INC. 
The political elite need to take seriously the allegations of the politician-drug 
nexus and dedicate energy and resources to thwart corruption that is destroying the state’s 
youth. Learning from Mexico, the state should concentrate on reducing drug demand and 
fighting corruption, rather than getting entangled in a war on drugs and focusing on 
conviction rates for drug users. The state government must realize that addressing core 
economic grievances and providing employment to the educated youth will reduce drug 
demand and at the same time provide a boost to the economy. To meet this goal, the 
government needs to shift away from focusing its energy on the traditional agriculture 
sector towards developing non-agricultural industries.  
Some economists suggest that universal subsidies be replaced in favor of targeted 
ones with the aim of building capabilities in deprived sections of society.344 Lakhwinder 
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Singh points to the need to transition to agro-processing and high value crops “with a 
focus on skilled labour-intensive and knowledge-based industries” as catalysts for 
positive change.345 Additionally, due to the negative impacts associated with agriculture, 
mainly “deteriorating groundwater quality, depleting soil fertility, growing incidents of 
pests and pesticide residues in various food products and environment pollution,” G.S. 
Romana makes a case for organic farming as a substitute for traditional methods.346 To 
help propel Punjab from an agriculture-based economy to an industrial economy, the 
state should increase research and development investment to one percent of the SDP 
with the goal of increasing it to 2.5% by 2020.347 These recommendations do not suggest 
that Punjab shift away from agriculture because India continues to rely on Punjab for 
food security. Currently, the state experiences significant crop losses “during the process 
of harvesting, threshing, transportation and storage of foodgrains.”348 This is especially 
concerning given that demands placed on Punjab will certainly increase with India’s 
growing population. To become more efficient, accommodate the state’s agriculture 
output, and help distressed farmers, the state needs to focus on developing better 
infrastructure, such as storage facilities and transportation mediums.349 This new 
infrastructure will reduce the percentage of precious foodgrains from rotting before 
reaching the consumer. The state government cannot address this food security issue 
alone as it is already lacking investment funding. Therefore, the central government also 
has a role to play in ensuring stability in the region through deliberate investment in 
research and development to make Punjab’s agriculture output more productive, and by 
creating employment opportunities by developing the industrial sector. 
The Indian government needs to view the growing drug problem in Punjab as a 
serious threat to regional stability. The Mumbai and Pathankot Air Force Base attacks 
underscore the close relationship between criminal syndicates involved in the drug trade 
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and terrorist organizations as illustrated in Chapter III. This relationship in Punjab may 
certainly deepen as more of the state’s population becomes dependent on drugs and even 
some on the drug trade for generating income to provide food for their families absent 
legal employment opportunities. There are close interdependencies between either side of 
the India-Pakistan border that enable the drug trade. The center needs to make a 
concerted effort to reduce corruption in the Border Security Force (BSF) as it serves as 
the first line of defense against traffickers. It is also the center’s responsibility to equip 
the state with the resources necessary to reduce drug demand, and to invest in the health 
care sector to treat addiction. Furthermore, the center needs to devise a plan to include 
Punjab into the nation’s economic prosperity run. This can only be accomplished if the 
center helps the state government move away from an agriculture-focused business 
model that India relies on for food security. Two additional factors necessitate that the 
Indian government address the drug problem in Punjab with urgency. 
Growing Chinese investment in Punjab, Pakistan and India’s foreign policy 
approach towards Balochistan, Pakistan also influence instability in Punjab, India. First, 
the $51 billion China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will aid Pakistan’s economic 
aspirations,350 but more importantly, is likely to bring new industry and economic 
prosperity to Punjab, Pakistan. As of September 2016, of the planned 330 projects, 176 
CPEC projects were assigned to Punjab, Pakistan and its government is creating a 
welcoming environment to attract internal and external investment.351 This reality is 
important because as with Punjab, India, agriculture is also the largest sector in Punjab, 
Pakistan, making it the breadbasket of Pakistan. As the economic benefits of CPEC 
trickle into its agrarian neighbor, population in Punjab, India may certainly feel a lack of 
investment and economic development in their own state as further discrimination. This 
perception is already present as Punjab envies the relative economic prosperity in other 
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Indian states like Gujarat. Second, Pakistan has accused India of using its intelligence 
agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), to support the Balochistan insurgency in 
Pakistan; India denies this claim, but Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has openly 
shared his concern for the plight of the Balochi people.352 Dissatisfaction in Punjab, India 
presents Pakistan with another opportunity besides Kashmir to counter India’s 
involvement in Balochistan. Pakistan may not face much difficulty in encouraging anti-
India sentiment in Punjab, India because a large section of the population there is already 
displeased with the inaction of both the center and state governments. The drug networks, 
meanwhile, provide the routes and resources for aiding the discontent. Furthermore, the 
previous Khalistan insurgency’s aftermath is still a part of the collective Sikh memory 
that plays into the hands of external actors. These developments highlight the urgency in 
addressing the growing drug epidemic and declining economy in Punjab as they form the 
setting that led to the previous insurgency. 
Ultimately, a thriving economy in Punjab is in the best interest of the nation 
because of its contributions to India’s food security and its strategic location in ensuring 
national security. The inability of the centeral and state governments to address the drug 
menace and the economic crisis in the state can have dire consequences for both aspects 
of Indian security. Getting deeply involved in resolving these critical concerns now will 
prevent a situation in which the Indian government finds itself involved in another 
prolonged battle to restore law and order in Punjab. The Indian government is already 
fighting an intense separatist insurgency in Kashmir, adding Punjab to this list once again 
may have serious consequences for Indian and regional stability. 
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